1 A sampling of these theories would include Beiner, Ronald, What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992Google Scholar); Bellah, Robert N., Madsen, Richard, Sullivan, William M., Swidler, Ann and Tipton, Steven M., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985Google Scholar); Amitai, Etzioni, ed., New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995Google Scholar); Etzioni, Amitai, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda (New York: Crown, 1993Google Scholar); Galston, William, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Galston, William, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105 (1995), 516–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glendon, Mary Ann, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991Google Scholar); Glendon, Mary Ann and Blankenhorn, David, eds., Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society (New York: Madison Books, 1995Google Scholar); and Macedo, Stephen, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990Google Scholar). For a useful overview and typology of contemporary citizenship theories, see Kymlicka, Will and Norman, Wayne, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” Ethics 104 (1994), 352–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The above works lie between (and complicate) Kymlicka and Norman's categories of “civil society theories” and “liberal virtue theories.” As the above list suggests, the majority of theorists of liberal citizenship are American, and their analyses can appear parochially so. In popular and political rhetoric, public policy and academic theory, however, the perspective has its influence in Canada and the United Kingdom as well (though even in these latter contexts, the United States tends to be treated as paradigmatic of the dangers represented by a decline in liberal citizen virtues).

2 For example, MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981Google Scholar); Sandel, Michael J., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983Google Scholar); and Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983Google Scholar).

3 Larmore, Charles, “Political Liberalism,” Political Theory 18 (1990), 339–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moon, J. Donald, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993Google Scholar); Nagel, Thomas, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991Google Scholar); and Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993Google Scholar).

4 For contextualist theorists, the term. “understandings” comprises not only the concepts a group self-consciously employs but the web of socially formed desires, habits and judgments that give these concepts their resonance for the group. There thus is an intimate link between understandings, values and forms of character.

5 See, for example, Buchanan, Allen E., “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 (1989), 852–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gutmann, Amy, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), 308–22Google Scholar; and Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991Google Scholar).

6 Rawls does not suggest that justice as fairness would dictate a resolution to every public dispute; he is most interested in the basic structure of society, and his examples tend to single out distributive issues. Though Rawls does at times seem to hope for a wider scope of application for his method: consider his comments on the reasonableness of a qualified right to abortion (Political Liberalism, 243ff.) or on advertising and freedom of speech (ibid., 363–66).

7 Abstract or general public agreements do in fact have determinate consequences when embodied in legislation; however messy the agreement that puts a law in place, the application of that law will have concrete effects. Unlike on the political liberal model, however, the consequences of institutionalized agreements do not necessarily sit comfortably with the comprehensive understandings of a diverse citizenry. Where Rawls's overlapping consensus would provide a way around disputes over basic justice, giving each party reasons from its own perspective to agree to previously controversial outcomes, the fact of pervasiveness suggests that political agreements—both abstract and concrete—will have a more approximate quality than this, and will derive a looser kind of legitimacy than Rawls seeks for “justice as fairness.” To use Rawlsian parlance, the shared public culture of liberal democratic societies permits something like a “constitutional consensus,” whereas the fact of pervasiveness stands permanently in the way of an overlapping consensus of the sort modeled by Rawls. This points not to a permanent deficit of justice or legitimacy, but to the fact that Rawls's theory premises justice and legitimacy on an unnecessarily and unrealistically strong form of agreement.

8 Galston and Macedo are two among many theorists of liberal citizenship; I focus upon their work because it provides the most carefully articulated versions of the argumentative strategy I wish to criticize, and because their failings are reiterated by other work in this vein. Their failings also have implications for theories of democratic citizenship, insofar as these repeat the strategy of arguing from putatively “shared” understandings of democratic virtues to particular policies for their cultivation. For a valuable review of “constitutive democratic theory” see Rosenblum, Nancy L., “Democratic Character and Community: The Logic of Congruence?” Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (1994), 67–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 As will become clear as the article progresses, Macedo is less prone than other theorists of liberal citizenship to offer a pessimistic account of the contemporary malaise, or put forward explicit policy recommendations. So while he, like the others, depicts liberalism as a regime with its own distinctive goods and virtues, he offers only the vaguest sense of how his revisionist liberalism makes a political difference. Macedo remains useful to this article for two reasons: first, his accounts of pervasiveness and public reasoning are insightful; second, in offering a plausible but politically inert account of the liberal virtues, he in fact exemplifies one of the tendencies I wish to criticize.

10 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 53 (emphasis in the original).

11 Macedo may have moved somewhat closer to a Rawlsian emphasis on the nonimpositional character of liberal public reasonableness; see Macedo, , “Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls,” Ethics 105 (1995), 468–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar He continues, however, to view liberalism as a way of life or regime that seeks to remake certain comprehensive commitments (ibid., 477 n. 39). He calls this “political liberalism with spine” (ibid., 470).

12 See Klosko, George, “Rawls’ ‘Political’ Philosophy and American Democracy,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 348–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neal, Patrick, “Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?” Political Theory 18 (1990), 24–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Walker, Brian, “John Rawls, Mikhail Bakhtin and Liberal Toleration,” Political Theory 23 (1995), 101–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 4.

14 Ibid., 10.

15 Glendon blames inarticulateness about liberal goods not on neutrality per se but on a deracinated “rights talk,” which “puts a damper on processes of public justification, communication, and deliberation upon which the continuing vitality of a democratic regime depends. It contributes to the erosion of the habits, practices, and attitudes of respect for others that are the ultimate and surest guarantees of human rights” (Glendon, Rights Talk, 171).

16 While Charles Taylor's analysis of contemporary liberalism is more nuanced than that offered by theorists of liberal citizenship, he shares this set of concerns, and also the belief that articulacy about liberal goods would help overcome certain problems of stalemate and fragmentation. See Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992Google Scholar).

17 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 115.

18 Ibid., 6–7.

19 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 6.

20 Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” 529.

21 An aspect of the alarmist tone particularly worth disputing is the blame implicitly heaped, by Galston especially, upon feminists, gay and lesbian activists and others who challenge traditional structures in the name of political and cultural recognition. Joan Tronto is appropriately scathing on the complacently mainstream “we” constructed by “cultural liberals” ( Tronto, Joan, “Ma, Can I Be a Feminist and Still Like Liberalism?” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992, 16–25Google Scholar). For examples of such complacency see Galston, Liberal Purposes, 273; Glendon, Rights Talk, 58, 121, 148–55; and Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism? passim.

22 Macedo does, in fact, acknowledge that “There are many ways of living as a liberal. Submitting to liberal justice and acting in conformity with the rules and regulations of the liberal state is, let us say, the proper extent of our enforceable political duties. A common posture of outward conformity with liberal rights and rules is enough to describe a situation of liberal coexistence, and is compatible with many attitudes, traits, and personal commitments: with mutual indifference and even hostility overlaid by a common fear of reprisal or punishment for breaches of liberal rules.” He goes on to write, though, that “Such attitudes were, very likely, characteristic of the ‘primitive moments’ of liberalism, as liberal tolerance emerged in the seventeenth century out of religious strife and civil war. Liberal possibilities are not, however, exhausted by liberalism's primitive moments” (Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 254–55).

23 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 17.

24 The interpretive dimension of theories of liberal citizenship is complicated by their argument that certain goods or understandings are insufficiently shared in contemporary liberal societies. Substantive descriptions of liberal goods have thus to be derived, in part, from accounts of what it would mean to live up to the values embodied in central institutions. In Macedo's words, “Liberal ideals provide a vision of what we ought to stand for as a people, and that vision is recognizably an extension of existing practices and attitudes” (Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 254).

25 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 221–24. For further lists of liberal goods and virtues—Galston offers a proliferation of lists—see ibid., 148, 178. Similarly general, and relatively uncontroversial in its vagueness, is Macedo's list of the constituents of a liberal public morality; such a morality “nurtures and draws upon the same capacities needed by persons to flourish in a pluralistic liberal society. These traits of character, or liberal virtues, include a reflective, self-critical attitude, tolerance, openness to change, self-control, a willingness to engage in dialogue with others, and a willingness to revise and shape projects in order to respect the rights of others or in response to fresh insight into one's own character and ideals” (Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 125).

26 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 233.

27 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 218.

28 Ibid., 263.

29 Ibid., 99.

30 Ibid., 234.

31 Although he does support existing forms of civic education in elementary schools, in the face of opposition from religious fundamentalists. See Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism.”

32 Kymlicka and Norman gesture at this “hollowness” and “timidity” in works that would promote citizen virtues (see “Return of the Citizen,” 368–69).

33 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 237.

34 Ibid., 178.

35 Galston and Glendon are joined in this prescriptive enterprise by other theorists and policy makers associated with The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, a journal in publication since 1991. This journal, representing a self-proclaimed “Communitarian Movement,” usefully illustrates the legitimate concerns, as well as the worrisome propensity for blithe and sweeping proposals, typical of theories of liberal citizenship. For a further example of blithe proposals built on dubious claims see Etzioni, Spirit of Community, passim.

36 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 243.

37 Ibid., 255–56.

38 Similarly placid is his proposal that public rhetoric be deployed in support of liberal values.

39 Aspects of American public school curricula have met with challenges from religious fundamentalists, either for lacking religious “balance” or for encouraging reflexivity about divinely ordained beliefs. In these cases, those who view them-selves as liberals tend to find themselves on one side of a fairly well-drawn line when it comes to issues of policy. See, for example, Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).

40 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 243–44.

41 Ibid., 247.

42 How exactly are liberal conceptions of self, relationship and value cultivated in this particular institutional setting (for example, the family, church, the work-place, educational institutions or participatory political institutions)? Through exposure to difference? A sense of comradeship? Having a role in decision-making practices? Being treated with respect or love by particular others? Recognizing and deferring to expertise or leadership? Exercising self-reflexivity and self-control? Participating in egalitarian relationships? Nancy Rosenblum's discussion of the cultivation of democratic character is telling for projects of liberal cultivation as well: she points out that once we appreciate the range of qualities that might be deemed salient to citizen virtue, we are likely to discover that particular formative contexts foster some of these qualities while subverting others. This poses a deep problem for those advocating particular projects of cultivation. See Rosenblum, “Democratic Character and the Logic of Congruence,” and also Rosenblum, Nancy L., “Civil Societies: Liberalism and the Moral Uses of Pluralism,” Social Research 61 (1994), 539–62.Google Scholar

43 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 265.

44 Ibid., 261.

45 Ibid., 268–69.

46 Ibid., 280.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 281.

49 Ibid., 222.

50 Ibid., 284–85.

51 Ibid., 287.

52 Iris Marion Young considers the influence of divorce and family structures on the capacities and characters of children, and suggests that there is dubious empirical evidence behind Galston's functional arguments for the two-parent heterosexual family. She points to studies that show family conflict rather than divorce to lie behind many of the ill effects that children suffer during marital breakups, a point that speaks against policies designed to make divorce more difficult. And her article as a whole shows the degree to which rhetoric linking single motherhood or family breakdown to character deficits among children is inflected by racism, sexism and other inclinations not obviously connected to or expressive of liberal virtues. See Young, Iris Marion, “Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values,” Ethics 105 (1995), 535–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 178.

54 Ibid., 181.

55 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 73.

56 Ibid., 72.

57 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 185.

58 The following discussion of crisscrossing citizenship stories is analogous, in certain respects, to James Tully's picture of Canadian “federation stories.” See Tully, James, “Diversity's Gambit Declined,” in Curtis, Cook, ed., Constitutional Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of 1992 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 149–98.Google Scholar

59 Amy Gutmann points to the contested nature of liberal virtues and their modes of cultivation, arguing that this lack of agreement is particularly acute for those approaches that argue from the public requirements of liberalism (and here she lumps together Rawls, Macedo and Galston); comprehensive or perfectionist liberalisms, on the other hand, can be more decisive on issues of civic education, given that they can appeal to the intrinsic value of such traits as individuality or autonomy. Gutmann provides a valuable discussion of how liberals can justify programmes of civic education in the face of illiberal objections; she seems far too sanguine, however, about the extent to which even such perfectionist liberal values as the dignity and worth of human beings have determinate implications for the substance of such programmes. See Gutmann, Amy, “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” Ethics 105 (1995), 557–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I would in fact endorse Gutmann's description of democratic civic education in schools, which emphasizes deliberative skills and exposure to difference: this says more about my own variety of liberal democratic partisanship, however, than about what liberal goods and virtues “require.” This latter point comes into relief if we compare Amy Gutrhann's “Undemocratic Education” with Galston's, William “Civic Education in a Liberal State,” both in Rosenblum, Nancy L., ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 71–88 and 89–101Google Scholar, respectively.

60 This obfuscation may in fact help to explain the appeal of the language of citizen virtues when it comes to complex and relatively intractable issues of policy: it allows those using the language to pat themselves on the collective head for their characters, while blaming social problems on the characters of others.

61 Sunstein, Cass R., “Incompletely Theorized Agreements,” Harvard Law Review 108 (1995), 1733–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I use the expression more loosely than Sunstein, who focuses primarily on a particular mode of legal adjudication.

62 When the language of liberal virtues functions in this way, it works only among those who buy into the pieties in question; as noted earlier, for example, there are religious groups in the US who staunchly resist the idea that school children should be exposed to diverse ways of life for the sake of inculcating tolerance. Arguing from shared liberal values is not a route to consensus, but at best a way of hammering out majoritarian agreements in contested areas of public policy.