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Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

J.P. Smit
J.P. Smit*
Affiliation:
Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, Stellenbosch, South Africa
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Extract

I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. These states are typically taken to be states that constitute having certain referential intentions. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. These are typically taken to be criteria like salience, conversational relevance and the like. The issue has recently flared up again in an exchange between Gauker (2008), who defends an E-theory, and Åkerman (2009; 2010), who defends an I-theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 43 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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