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When to think like an epistemicist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Matthew Mosdell
Matthew Mosdell*
Affiliation:
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, I spend most of the essay arguing that using a formal system like classical logic to manage seemingly vague situations requires practical principles to mediate between the formalism and what it aims to represent.

Keywords

Vaguenessepistemicismsorites paradoxpractical reason
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , August 2015 , pp. 538 - 559
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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