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Unger's Defense of Skepticism: New Wine In Old Bottles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Shane Andre
Shane Andre*
Affiliation:
California State University Long Beach
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Extract

Peter Unger has recently attempted to defend skepticism by means of a novel and ingenious theory about certain general features of our language. According to his theory, skepticism is a logical consequence of the fact that certain epistemic terms, including ‘certain’ and ‘know,’ belong to a much wider class of absolute terms whose strict meaning is such that they have little or no positive application to things in the world. The purpose of this paper is to enquire whether Unger's theory of absolute terms provides a stronger basis for skepticism than do other, more familiar, approaches. I shall argue that the theory cannot be regarded as an explication of the ordinary meaning of the terms in question; that the ordinary meaning of these terms can be understood by means of an alternative, if less exciting, model; and that the logic of our language does not commit us to skepticism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 453 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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References

1 ‘A Defense of Skepticism.’ Philosophical Review, 80 (1971) 198-219; and Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975) chap. 2

2 ‘A Defense of Skepticism; 203

3 Malcolm, Norman ‘Knowledge and Belief; Mind, 61 (1952) 178-89;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Edwards, Paul 'Russell's Doubts about Induction; Mind, 58 (1949) 141-63CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 ‘In Defense of Skepticism,’ 214

5 Ignorance, 74-82

6 Ignorance, 76. In a footnote, Unger adds the qualification: ‘This is true for stress anyway, discounting syllabic emphasis. With modifiers, the situation may be more complex.'

7 An illuminating account of the role of emphasis in the use of statements will be found in Dretske, Fred I. ‘Contrastive Statements,’ Philosophical Review, 81 (1972) 411-37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 ‘Knowing and not Knowing; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 53 (1952-53) 151-72

9 ‘A Plea for Excuses,’ Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961) 137

10 In one place Unger calls such terms ‘absolute (limit) terms’ (his. italics; Ignorance, 49).

11 E.g., Prichard, H.A. Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1950) 87Google Scholar

12 ‘Knowledge and Belief,’ 178-89. For different interpretations of Malcolm's distinction, see Jonathan Harrison, ‘Malcolm, Mr. on “Knowledge and Belief,“' Analysis, 13 (1952-53) 66–71;Google Scholar and Richard Taylor, ‘A note on Knowing and Belief,’ Analysis, 13 (1952-53) 143-4.

13 I have borrowed freely from ideas expressed in A.D. Woozley, ‘Knowing and not Knowing.'