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Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2023

Giulia Luvisotto Open the ORCID record for Giulia Luvisotto [Opens in a new window]
Giulia Luvisotto*
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki Helsinki, Finland
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The conception of responsibility for beliefs typically assumed in the literature mirrors the practices of accountability for actions. In this paper, I argue that this trend leaves a part of what it is to be responsible unduly neglected, namely the practices of attributability. After offering a diagnosis for this neglect, I bring these practices into focus and develop a virtue-theoretic framework to vindicate them. I then investigate the specificity of the belief case and conclude by resisting two challenges, namely that attributability cannot amount to genuine responsibility and that it can be reduced to a sort of accountability.

Keywords

Responsibility for beliefsattributabilityaccountabilityvirtue theoryGary Watson
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 52 , Issue 7 , October 2022 , pp. 761 - 776
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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