1 This work is a translation of Der Positivismusstreit in der Deutschen Sociologie, which was first published in 1969.

2 In his view of Der Positivismusstreit in der Deutschen Sociologie, which is reproduced here, Popper agrees (p. 289) that he would have done better to have directly engaged the ‘dialectical school’.

3 This is also Albert's view; cf. p. 164.

4 I found another paper by Frisby, (‘The Popper-Adorno Controversy’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2 (1972) pp. 105-19)CrossRefGoogle Scholar much more useful than his introduction.

5 What should we say, for instance, about Adorno's claim (p. 58) that ‘positivism is the spirit of the age, analogous to the mentality of jazz fans’? For my part I find it difficult to have much confidence in a philosopher who during a critical discussion of positivism relies on a secondary source for the information that ‘even Carnap relinquishes the principle of the reduction of all terms to observational predicates and introduces alongside observational language a theoretical one which has only been partially interpreted’ (p. 65).

6 It is important that the reader keep in mind when reading this paper that I have reconstructed Habermas's position as it appears in The Positivist Dispute. Habermas is not a particularly careful writer; his work tends to be sideranging, and—as commentators regularly emphasize—“highly nuanced”. My view is that there is some advantage to having before us a relatively clearly stated argument.

7 Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 11, sth ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 264.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 278.

9 Cf. Habermas, J., Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p. 42.Google Scholar

10 These last remarks should suffice to convince the reader that, contrary to what some commentators have argued, The Positivist Dispute does have something to do with positivism, and that Popper's denial—already noted—that he is or ever was a positivist is irrelevant in the present context. If I am right in thinking that the debate concerns whether there is a unity of scientific method, whether science is value free, whether there is a sharp separation between theory and practice, etc., then clearly what is at stake is some of the central doctrines of positivism and Popperian critical rationalism.

11 Habermas's notion of a cognitive interest is far from unproblematic. Certainly when he says that scientists have an interest in technical control, he does not mean that each scientist has a personal interest in such matters. Rather, he would appear to have in mind the sort of thing we have in mind when we say, e.g. ‘the human species has an interest in self-preservation’. For a useful discussion of this difficult notion, see Ruddick's, S. ‘Critical Notice of Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1973)Google Scholar, section III.

12 To mention just one difficulty: since Habermas holds that cognitive interests are neither contingent nor transcendental, it is not clear what their status is. Of course, it is of no help to say that they have a ‘quasi-transcendental status’. Cf. Habermas, J., Knowledge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971 ),Google Scholar chapter 9.

13 Albert's response to this argument—that it assumes an unacceptable instrumentalistic account of scientific theories—seems to me to rest on a misunderstanding of Habermas's position. (For Albert's argument, see pp. 170-71 and pp. 240-41). I can see no reason for thinking that Habermas's view is incompatible with anti-instrumentalism of the sort discussed (e.g.) by Popper in his ‘Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge’. Cf. Popper, K.R., Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Harper and Row, 1963)Google Scholar. In particular notice that Habermas holds that the ‘objectivity of the validity of statements … is made possible—and is purchased—through restriction to a technical cognitive interest’ (p. 158). (Very briefly, the argument is that the objectivity of science resides in its ability to make predictions and to predict an event is to be able to say what will and what will not bring it about, i.e. to know what must be done to control its occurrence.) However, having said this, I should also note two further points. First, Habermas's response to Albert does not touch the issue at hand: it is not sufficient merely to observe that theories provide information which is ‘technically utilizable’ (p. 280); what needs to be shown is that science does more than just this. Second, Habermas's argument concerning the ‘objectivity of the validity of statements’ rests on a highly controversial view concerning the relationship between predication and technical control. (For a discussion of this latter point, see Q. Gibson's review of Fay, B., Social Theory and Political Practice, in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1977), p. 159.Google Scholar

14 See Neumann, J. von, Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata, edited and completed by Burks, A.W. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 188-23Google Scholar, for some general considerations concerning self-reproduction and in particular the problem of self-reflexivity. Burks's comments on pp. 123-26 are also highly pertinent in the present context. For an introduction to some of the difficulties in formulating the problems of self-reproduction and self-description, see Thatcher, J.W., ‘Self-Describing Turing Machines and SelfReproducing Cellular Automata’ in Burks, A.W. (ed.), Essays on Callular Automata (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970)Google Scholar, section 5.

15 Habermas seems to suggest that his view is not open to the criticism of holism that Nagel rehearses in The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), chapter 11. (Cf. p. 131.) However, as Albert points out (p. 168), this is far from obvious.

16 If we interpret Habermas's argument in the way suggested, Habermas's view about what counts as a validating instance cannot be criticized as placing ‘immunizing strategies at a premium’ (cf. Albert, p. 231). Very much to the point, however, is another objection of Albert's, namely that if we pay too much attention to the ‘fund of pre-scientifically accumulated experience’ we are likely to be insufficiently open to new ideas (cf. pp. 175-76). Finally in this context I should also note that Habermas's development of the argument I have been reconstructing is marred by an unfortunate account of the analytical-empiricist's view of experience. If, as Habermas suggests, the analytical-empiricist restricts experience to ‘controlled observation of physical behaviour, which is set up in an isolated field under reproducible conditions by subjects interchangeable at will’ (p. 135), disciplines such as historical geology must be regarded as being beyond the scope of ‘analytic empirical modes of procedure.’

17 Popper, K.R. The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).Google Scholar For a careful discussion of Popper's criticisms of these doctrines see A., Donagan, ‘Popper's Examination of Historicism’ in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle( Open Court, 1974)Google Scholar, especially pp. 909-12.

18 Mannheim, K. Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 272.Google Scholar

19 Popper, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p. 93.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., p. 105.

21 Ibid., p. 108.

22 Habermas can also be seen (in The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics) to be arguing for the same view on the basis of the fact that ‘we are normally in no doubt at all about the validity of a basic statement’ (p. 153). This argument, which is weaker than the one considered in the text, is effectively criticized by Albert (p. 182).

23 This is not to say that there are no external influences on the “cognitive content” of science as opposed to, e.g., its direction and rate of growth. My point is that if there are such influences they are of a much more subtle kind than Habermas seems to think and that it is unreasonable to think of science, even in a very strict sense, as a product of ‘the seventeenth century’ (p. 156). Concerning this last point, see for example Hall, A.R., ‘Merton Revisited or Science and Society in the Seventeenth Century’, History of Science (1963), especially pp. 6–10Google Scholar.

24 Habermas's response to this objection of Albert's seems to me quite inadequate (cf. p. 204). For a general discussion of the kind of iddues referred to in this paragraph see Scheffler, I. Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 36–44.Google Scholar

25 This issue is discussed in detail by Deutscher, M. in his ‘Popper's Problem of an Empirical Basis’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1968), pp. 277-88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. especially p. 287.

26 Quine, W.V.O., Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960), pp. 17–18Google Scholar. Also see Quine, W.V.O. ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper and Roe, 1953)Google Scholar, section 6.

27 For this point, see Feyerabend, P. Against Method (London: New left Books, 1975),Google Scholar especially chapter 15, and Johansson, I. A Critique of Karl Poppers Methodology (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1975)Google Scholar, especially chapter 5.

28 Laudan, L. Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chapter 2.Google Scholar

29 Cf. footnote 10 above.

30 These observations also have a bearing on Habermas's rejection of the view, suggested by Albert, that he is proposing ‘something approaching a new “method” alongside the already established methods of social scientific research’ (p. 199). Unless we resort to dialectics it is difficult to see how we can accept both Habermas's dialectical theory and Popper's analytical-empirical characterization of the sciences. (In this regard, see Albert's remarks on pp. 227-28).

31 It should be borne in mind that Habermas discusses many issues I have not had the opportunity to consider—the relation between standards and values, non-instrumental conceptions of rationality, Bartley's critique of critical rationalism, and so one.