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Thomas Reid on truth, evidence and first principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Keith Lehrer
Keith Lehrer*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona, University of Miami
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Reid had a theory of the human mind containing a theory of truth, both of our evidence of truth and the conditions of truth, fully consistent with empiricism. The justification and evidence of first principles is something felt in consciousness rather than some external relation. This is the result of our faculties, original and natural powers of our constitution. Original convictions and conceptions arise from our faculties in response to experience as a result of our natural development. Reid combines elements of foundationalism, coherentism, falliblism and nominalism. I distinguish and compare Reid to Hume, Moore, Quine, James and Wittgenstein.

Keywords

truthevidencefacultiesfirst principlesThomas Reid
Type
Epistemology
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue S1: New Essays on Reid , July 2011 , pp. 156 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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