1 Throughout I shall presume the truth of an objectivist metaethic because the problems to be discussed only get any real grip when this presumption is made, a presumption which historically has been common to the most significant discussions of these problems.

2 There are interesting connections here with remarks by Williams, B. in Morality (Harmondsworth, 1973),Google Scholar Ch. 8. Swinburne, R. gives his backing to much the same point in ‘Duty and the Will of God', Canadian journal of Philosophy, 4 (1974), pp. 213–227CrossRefGoogle Scholar (especially. p. 224f).

3 By focussing just on the notion of ‘private property’ (and, indeed, in taking it to be justifiable) Brody significantly narrows the range of questions about the obligatoriness of vegetarianism. He effectively sidesteps what may plausibly be regarded as more urgent questions about the justice of our treatment of nonhumans as well as the possibility that meat-eating should be ruled out or reduced for consequentialist reasons.

4 Adams's discussion of whether believers’ claims are claims about the meaning of ethical terms is very good (see especially section VI). Even so, as he points out, his remarks on the meaning of such terms as believers use, are readily detachable from the rest of his theory. (Because the believer shares a common moral discourse with unbelievers, ‘wrong’ cannot just simply mean ‘contrary to God's will or commands'. But this, as Adams recognizes, is a general difficulty that applies to much else than merely moral discourse.)

5 It must be the ‘badness’ not the ‘wrongness’ to which Adams appeals.

6 Even though I do not think his own position can be sustained, R. Swinburne does draw attention to the importance of God's omniscient nature in determining what God morally can will. See ‘Duty and the Will of God', op. cit., pp. 22lf.

7 I am grateful to John Kleinig, Bruce Langtry and Paul Helm for their vigorous but much appreciated criticism of a draft of this essay. I have continued to go my own way on some matters.