Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T19:18:08.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Hasko von Kriegstein Open the ORCID record for Hasko von Kriegstein [Opens in a new window]
Hasko von Kriegstein*
Affiliation:
Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Achievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently (and thus an achievement), only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way.

Keywords

Achievementcompetenceluckvalue of achievementvalue theorywell-being
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2019 , pp. 394 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, M., 2009. “Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-HowDistinction.” Synthese, 170. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bengson, J., and Moffet, M.. 2007. “Know How and Concept Possession.” Philosophical Studies, 136. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9146-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradford, G., 2012. “Evil Achievements.” The Philosophers’ Magazine, 59: 51–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradford, G., 2013. “The Value of Achievements.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01452.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradford, G., 2014. “Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation.” Erkenntnis 80 (1): 97-116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradford, G., 2015. Achievement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J., Jarvis, B., and Rubin, K.. 2015. “Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.” Philosophical Studies, 172 (6): 1603–1623. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crisp, R., 2006. “Hedonism Reconsidered.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J., 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fernandez, M., 2016. Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford: OUP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gettier, E., 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 23. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A., 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy, 64. doi:10.2307/2024268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J., 2003. “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.” In Intellectual Virtue: Perspective from Ethics and Epistemology, edited by DePaul, M. and Zagzebski, L.. OxfordUniversity Press: Oxford.Google Scholar
Greco, J., 2010. Achieving Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J., 2012. “A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (1): 1–26. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00567.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hetherington, S., 2006. “How to Know (That Knowledge-That Is Knowledge-How).” In Epistemology Futures, edited by Hetherington, S.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hurka, T., 1993. Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hurka, T., 1998. “Two Kinds of Organic Unity.” The Journal of Ethics, 2. doi:10.1023/A:1009795120631.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, T., 2006a): ‘Games and the Good’; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary. Volumes 80Google Scholar
Hurka, T., 2006b. “Virtuous Act, Virtuous Dispositions.” Analysis, 66 (289): 69–76. doi:10.1093/analys/66.1.69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, L., 2005. “Achievement and the Meaningfulness of Life.” Philosophical Papers, 34. doi:10.1080/05568640509485166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagan, S., 1998. “Rethinking Intrinsic Value.” The Journal of Ethics, 2. doi:10.1023/A:1009782403793.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keller, S., 2004. “Welfare and the Achievement of Goals.” Philosophical Studies, 121. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000040377.50002.88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keller, S., 2009. “Welfare as Success.” Noûs, 43. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00723.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J., 1976. “Events as Property Exemplifications.” In Action Theory, edited by Brand, M. and Walton, D.. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Koethe, J., 2002. “Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How.” The Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.2307/3655587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korsgaard, C., 1983. “Two Distinctions in Goodness.” The Philosophical Review, 92. doi:10.2307/2184924.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J., 2007. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese, 158. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Littlejohn, C., 2014. “Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.” Episteme, 11 (4): 369–389. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKinnon, R., 2013. “Getting Luck Properly under Control.” Metaphilosophy, 44 (4): 496–511. doi:10.1111/meta.2013.44.issue-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKinnon, R., 2014. “You Make Your Own Luck.” Metaphilosophy, 45 (4–5): 558–577. doi:10.1111/meta.12107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Navarro, J., 2015. “No Achievement Beyond Intention.” Synthese, 192. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0708-2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noë, A., 2005. “Against Intellectualism.” Analysis, 65. doi:10.1093/analys/65.4.278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pollock, J., 1990. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.Google Scholar
Portmore, D., 2007. “Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (2): 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D., 2002. “Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 64: 19–55. doi:10.1163/18756735-90000773.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D., 2005. Epistemic Luck. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D., 2010. “Knowledge and Understanding.” In The Nature and Value of Knowledge, edited by Pritchard, D., Millar, A., and Haddock, A.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D., 2012. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” The Journal of Philosophy, 109 (3): 247–279. doi:10.5840/jphil201210939.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabinowicz, W., and Roennow-Rasmussen, T.. 1999. “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100 (1): 33-51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G., 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Ryle, G., 1945. “Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46: 1–16.Google Scholar
Snowdon, P., 2004. “The Presidential Address: Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E., 2007. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1: A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E., 2010. “How Competence Matters in Epistemology.” Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 465–475. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00200.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E., 2011. Knowing Full Well. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, E., 2015. Judgement and Agency. Oxford: OUP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanley, J., and Williamson, T.. 2001. “Knowing How.” Journal of Philosophy, 98. doi:10.2307/2678403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turri, J., 2011. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosopher’s Imprint, 11 (8): 1-11.Google Scholar
Turri, J., 2016. “Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.” In Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, edited by Fernandez, M.. Oxford: OUP.Google Scholar
von Kriegstein, H., 2017a. “Effort and Achievement.” Utilitas, 29 (1): 27–51. doi:10.1017/S0953820816000170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Kriegstein, H., 2017b. “On Being Difficult: Towards an Account of the Nature of Difficulty.” Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-1005-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zimmerman, M., 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar