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Scanlon’s modal metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Gideon Rosen
Gideon Rosen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014) T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense.

Keywords

Scanlonmetaethicsrealismnormativitymodality
Type
Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons; author meets critics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 6 , 2017 , pp. 856 - 876
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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