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Scanlon’s modal metaphysics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
In Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014) T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense.
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- Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons; author meets critics
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- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017
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