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Rorty's Mark of the Mental and His Disappearance Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

R. I. Sikora
R. I. Sikora*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Extract

In “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” Richard Rorty argues that although there is no characteristic that marks off everything that is mental, the contents of the stream of consciousness (thoughts and sensations) may be considered as that which is paradigmatically mental, and they are distinguished by the fact that sincere first-person reports about them are currently treated as incorrigible. (From now on, “incorrigible” will stand for “treated as incorrigible.“) He adds that “beliefs, desires, moods, emotions, intentions, etc.“ (p. 491) are also taken to be mental because reports about them are almost incorrigible.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , September 1974 , pp. 191 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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References

1 The journal of Philosophy (June 25, 1970). Unless otherwise noted, all quotations will be from this article.

2 Rorty has acknowledged in a letter to me that I have given an accurate account of his argument for the disappearance thesis. He says, “the argument you sketch is indeed the only argument which I have to offer.“