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A relational account of intellectual autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Benjamin Elzinga
Benjamin Elzinga*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., USA
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Abstract

According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I claim that intellectual autonomy requires a sense of one’s standing as an equal member of the epistemic community.

Keywords

Relational autonomyintellectual autonomyhermeneutical injusticeknow how
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 22 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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