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A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ernest Sosa  and
Mark Pastin
Ernest Sosa
Affiliation:
Brown University
Mark Pastin
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
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Extract

Richard Feldman in ‘Actions and De Re Beliefs’ attacks ‘latitudinarian’ accounts of de re belief in terms of de dicta belief, including those defended in print by one or the other of us. Feldman's case against latitudinarian views rests on the claim that such accounts do not allow de re attitudes an explanatory role they obviously can fulfil.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 1981 , pp. 735 - 739
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8 (1978) 577-82.

2 Feldman's critique focuses on such accounts advanced and defended by Ernest Sosa in ‘Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re,’ Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970) 883-96, and in ‘Rejoinder to Hintikka,’ Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971) 498-501; and by Pastin, Mark in ‘About De Re Belief,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24 (1974) 569-75,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and in his thesis The Logic of Evidence (Harvard 1973).

3 We accept this as a working statement of latitudinarianism, although we would qualify it in ways not directly relevant to the present discussion.

4 Feldman, 580-1.

5 Our thanks to Lynne Rudder Baker, Richard Feldman, and William Lycan for helpful comments.