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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lucy Campbell Open the ORCID record for Lucy Campbell [Opens in a new window]
Lucy Campbell*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Abstract

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.

Keywords

Intentionpropositional attitudesnon-propositional attitudesexecuting an intentionintentional action
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , March 2019 , pp. 230 - 252
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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