Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T01:51:32.804Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Properties, laws, and worlds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Deborah C. Smith
Deborah C. Smith*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Kent State University, Kent, OH44242, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view.

Keywords

Propertieslawsquidditismpossible worldsimpossible worldsnecessitarianismcontingentism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , August 2015 , pp. 471 - 489
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brogaard, Berit, and Salerno, Joe. 2013. “Remarks on Counterpossibles.”; Synthese 190: 639–660.10.1007/s11229-012-0196-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David. 2002. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”; In Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Hawthorne, J. and Gendler, T., 145–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 2002. “The Varieties of Necessity.”; In Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Hawthorne, J. and Gendler, T., 253–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Handfield, Toby. 2004. “Counterlegals and Necessary Laws.”; The Philosophical Quarterly 54: 402–419.10.1111/phiq.2004.54.issue-216CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kment, Boris. 2006. “Counterfactuals and the Analysis of Necessity.”; Philosophical Perspectives 20: 237–302.10.1111/phpe.2006.20.issue-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 2009. “Ramseyan Humility.”; In Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Braddon-Mittchell, D. and Nola, R., 203–222. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Nolan, Daniel. 1997. “Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.”; Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 535–572.Google Scholar
Nolan, Daniel. 2013. “Impossible Worlds.”; Philosophy Compass 8: 360–372.10.1111/phc3.12027CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005. “Quiddistic Knowledge.”; Philosophical Studies 123: 1–32.10.1007/s11098-004-5221-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010. “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.”; Philosophical Review 119: 31–76.10.1215/00318108-2009-025CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vander Laan, David. 1997. “The Ontology of Impossible Worlds.”; Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 595–620.Google Scholar
Vander Laan, David. 2004. “Counterpossibles and Similarity.”; In Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, edited by Jackson, F. and Priest, G., 258–275. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, Jennifer. 2010. “What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?”; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80: 595–637.10.1111/(ISSN)1933-1592CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Alastair. 2013. “Schaffer on Laws of Nature.”; Philosophical Studies 164: 653–667.10.1007/s11098-012-9878-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Jennifer. 2014. “Hume’s Dictum and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence.”; In Chance, Temporal and Asymmetry, edited by Wilson, Alastair, 258–279. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, Stephen. 1993. “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?”; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 1–42.10.2307/2108052CrossRefGoogle Scholar