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Profiting from poverty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ole Koksvik Open the ORCID record for Ole Koksvik [Opens in a new window]  and
Gerhard Øverland
Ole Koksvik
Affiliation:
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Gerhard Øverland
Affiliation:
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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Abstract

We consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.

Keywords

Povertypoverty-profit principlesweatshopsprofiting from povertybenefiting from injusticeexploitation
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2019 , pp. 341 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

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