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Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Philip Woodward Open the ORCID record for Philip Woodward [Opens in a new window]
Philip Woodward*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN, USA
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Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.

Keywords

Phenomenal propertiesintentional propertiesphenomenal intentionality
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 5 , August 2019 , pp. 606 - 627
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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