1 To my knowledge the idea that such uses of the verb ‘εἷναι’ in Greek philosophy might be profitably interpreted in this way was introduced by Owen, G.E.L. (‘A Metaphysical Paradox,’ in Bambrough, Rendord, ed., New Essays On Plato and Aristotle [New York: Humanities Press 1965] 71, n.1)Google Scholar. He originally suggested that for Plato to be is to be something or other but later (‘Plato on Not-Being,’ in Vlastos, Gregory, ed., Plato, I [Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1971]266) he recants.Google Scholar

2 I have argued that some of Plato's least plausible theses become far more plausible when his syntactically incomplete uses of ‘dvut’ are understood this way. The theses are that only forms are real (‘Plato on Real Being,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 3 [1980] 213-20) and that only forms are knowable (‘Plato on the Unknowability of the Sensible World,’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, 3 [July, 1987] 291-305).

3 I will also speak of the participle as sometimes used as an incomplete copula. As Mourelatos, Alexander P.D. (The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image and Argument in the Fragments [New Haven., CT: Yale University Press 1970])Google Scholar points out, ‘The participle of the Greek verb “to be” does preserve in it the ambiguity of the verb’ (52) and ‘Its [the participles’] meaning depends on the exact meaning of the subjectless “ἐσυι“’ (53). In claiming that the incomplete copula occurs in a given sentence we are saying something about how that sentence is to be understood. The incomplete copula is not the verb ‘εἷναι’ with a strange or special meaning.

4 See Euthydemus, 293C1-6, for such a use of ‘ἐπίσταμαι,’ Republic, 476E7, for such a use of ‘γιγνώσκω’ (participle), 248A8 and B8 for ‘δοχάζω’ (infinitive).

5 See Matthen, Mohan, ‘Greek Ontology and the “Is” of Truth’ (Phronesis 28 [1983] 113-35)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a very different way of interpreting syntactically incomplete uses of the verb ‘to be’ which occur in contexts in which the verb seems to be used both as a copula and as meaning ‘exist.'

6 Though it is probably true that ‘ἔστι’ sometimes means ‘exists’ in the Greek of Parmenides’ day, it is not obvious. What leads me to say this is the fact that all candidates for such a use that I am familiar with seem appropriately translated by the English ‘there is’ idiom and this idiom is not synonymous with ‘exists.’ If it were, the following discourse would sound flatly contradictory and it does not: ‘Centaurs, gold mountains and zombies are among the many things that do not exist. Not only are there (or “it is true that there are” to get word order correct) many things that do not exist, there are also many things that cannot exist, e.g., round squares, married bachelors and colored numbers.’ Consider the following two examples of the ‘existential’ verb ‘to be’ cited by Kahn, C. (The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek [Dortrecht: Reidel 1973] 248-9)Google Scholar: ‘there was among the Trojans one Dares .. .’ (ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι △άρης … ‘[Iliad, 5.9] and ‘Now, there is a certain island in the surging sea .. .’ ('νῆσος ἔπιτά τις ἔστι πολυκλύστῳ ἐν πόντῳ…’ [Odyssey 4.844]). Compare these with ‘there are in his dreams (imagination, philosophy) many ideal statesmen .. .’ The point is that given the last of these examples, it is not ‘there is’ which carries the existential force but the phrases telling us where and among what the thing in question is. I am, of course, not arguing that ‘exists’ is never a correct translation of ‘ἔστι.’ ‘A certain Dares existed among the Trojans …’ is a perfectly good translation of the above sentence. If, however, the English, ‘there are many things that do not exist,’ were translated into Greek, it is the ‘there are’ that would be expressed by ἔστι,’ not the ‘exist,’ which would have to be accommodated in some other way.

7 This point is argued at length by Owen, ‘Plato On Not-Being,’ 244-8. It is denied by Mourelatos, A.P.D., ‘Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides’ (Monist 62 (Jan., 1979] 13, n.14).Google Scholar

8 Furth, Montgomery, ‘Elements of Eleatic Ontology,’ reprinted in Mourelatos, A.P.D., ed., The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1974), 252.Google Scholar

9 ‘To speak (think) of nothing’ would in most contexts be elliptical for ‘to speak (think) of nothing important (interesting, worth mentioning).’ Let me stipulate that it is to be read straight here.

10 In asking us not to snap at the equation Furth may have been asking us to understand ‘nothing’ in Parmenides poem as synonymous with ‘what does not exist.’ If so, ‘George was speaking of nothing’ would not mean ‘George is not speaking (meaningfully).’ My objection would then be that Furth attributes two dubious assumptions to Parmenides where none is required.

11 Plato saw this and argued for the meaninglessness of ‘what is not anything’ in the Sophist, 237C-239C.

12 The first example is from Quine, W.V.O., Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press 1960), 133Google Scholar; see this for an explanation as to why ‘nothing’ is sometimes used as a definite term.

13 Owen, ‘Eleatic Questions,’ 95. I accept the argument there against ‘τὸ ἐόν’ as the grammatical subject. For Gallop, David (‘“Is” or “Is not,“’ Monist 62 [Jan., 1979] 68)Google Scholar ‘a thing’ is acceptable as long as it is clearly understood that ‘a thing’ functions as an indefinite pronoun. If, however, it does function as an indefinite pronoun in the sentence, ‘Either a thing is (exists) or a thing is not (does not exist)’ that sentence has no truth value and gets us no further than ‘it is or it is not.’ ‘A thing (i.e. everything) is such that it either is (exists) or is not (does not exist)’ does have a truth value. However, Parmenides does speak of two paths and it would be difficult to say informatively what, e.g., the first path is, on this understanding. We are back with ‘a thing is,’ and this amounts to ‘it is.’ I agree with Gallop (79, n.51) that it is τὸ ἐόν that is proven to have various attributes in Fr. 8.

14 Strictly speaking, it is not true to say that what-is-not is unknowable. What-is not is nothing and thus it is not unknowable. Parmenides is far more careful than I in avoiding affirmatives with ‘μηδέν’ and ‘τὸ μὴ ἐόν’ as subject expressions. When I am guilty of this my point can be made by speaking of language. For example, ‘What-is-not is unknowable’ becomes ‘No sentence of the form “what-is-not is F” is knowable.'

15 I accept the construction of, among others, Owen, G.E.L. (‘Electic Questions,’ 60)Google Scholar, Furley, D. (‘Notes on Parmenides,’ in Lee, E.N., Mourelatos, A.P.D. and Rorty, R., eds., Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos [Assen: Van Gorcum 1973]11, n.37)Google Scholar and Kirk, and Raven, (The Presocratic Philosophers [Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1957] 269-71)Google Scholar. Kahn, C. (‘The Thesis of Parmenides,’ Review of Metaphysics 22 [1968/9]122, n.26)Google Scholar has most recently disputed the possibility of this construction.

16 Owen reads ‘μηδὲν δ'οὐκ ἔστιν’ of B6.2 as the trivial truth ‘it is necessry that what does not exist does not exist’ and attributes to Parmenides an invalid argument ('Eleatic Question,’ 94, n.2). Barnes, J. (The Presocratic Philosophers [New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1979]166Google Scholar) reads this as the obviously false statement ‘(x)(if x does not exist, x cannot exist)’ and finds the argument to be valid. I suggest we read it, ‘(x) (if xis nothing then x cannot be anything),’ which seems true enough. While I am not sure what I would mean by calling the argument valid, given all of the modalities in it, it seems cogent enough.

17 I read ‘ἐόν’ in B6.1 and ‘ἔστι’ in B6.1 and B6.2 as potential. Giving ‘ἔστι’ a locative or availability sense (Robinson, T.M., ‘Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real,’ Canadian journal of Philosophy 4, 4 [June, 1975] 627)CrossRefGoogle Scholar does not provide these sentences with enough meaning to evaluate their truth (unless ‘is there to F’ is simply understood as ‘can be Fed’).

18 Reading ‘nothing’ in ‘It is not possible for nothing to be’ as an indefinite pronoun we get the dubious statement that it is necessary that something is (something or other). If it can't be the case that nothing is, it must be the case that something is.

19 See Barnes, J. (The Presocratic Philosophers, 185)Google Scholar for evidence that this is the proper sense of ‘from’ ('ἐκ’).

20 Plato, Theaetetus (Oxford: Clarendon 1973), 118. The Greek in question is, ‘τῶϝ μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν’ (Theaetetus, 152A3-4). Another example I would cite from the Theaetetus is, ‘ … γίγνεται πάϝτα ἄ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες‘(l52E8-El). ‘All which we, speaking incorrectly, say is something or other (in fact) becomes those things.'

21 Two puzzling lines I have not discussed, B8.12-13 and B8.36-7, become more intelligible, at least as far as what motivates them, on this interpretation than on others. Suppose we envision Parmenides considering the following objection: Granted, Parmenides, you have proven that a thing cannot come to be a thing that is. But you have not shown us that what is can't come to be something or other from being something or other else. ‘The force of belief will not allow that anything other than itself [i.e., what-is] comes to be from what-is’ (B8.12-13). The idea would be that if anything other than what-is carne to be from what-is it would have to be what-is-not.

22 A.P.D. Mourelatos ('Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,’ 7) writes, ‘I work back from the “Doxa.” For it seems plausible to assume that if we understand what is critically wrong, in Parmenides’ eyes, about the world view of “mortals” we shall ipso facto understand what is critically right about “truth.“’ My point is a) that the converse is equally true and b) Parmenides (87.5-6) would have us understand what is wrong with mortals’ opinions from seeing what is right about ‘truth.’ Austin, Scott (Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986], 19-20)CrossRefGoogle Scholar thinks that a ‘compelling’ reason to disagree with the existence interpretation of the verb ‘to be,’ is that Parmenides meant to rule out ‘other kinds of “is not” besides the “is not” which says that something does not exist.’ Examples are found in the ‘Opinion’ section where everything is false and deceitful. To argue this way, and this is my point, is to ignore the fact that in B8 conclusions are argued for which entail the falsity of the ‘Opinion’ section. To argue this way is to ignore Parmendes’ reasonable plea to ‘judge by reason the much contested refutation uttered by me.'

23 ‘“Is” or “Is Not,“’ 78 n.35

24 ‘Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,’ 13, n.14. Mourelatos also considers ‘there is something that is somewhat’ ([∃x][ ∃φ]φ x), as a possible construct of the bare ‘ἔστιν’ of B2.3, 2.5 and B8.2 (The Route of Parmenides, 269). He thus recognizes that ‘e[vat’ may be construed ‘to be something.’ He rejects the interpretation on the grounds that it is trivial. Important differences between Mourelatos’ final interpretation and the one offered here are: a) on Mourelatos’ interpretation occurrences of ‘ εἶναι ‘ which are syntactically incomplete indicate a sentence form and have no truth value while on the present interpretation there is an implicit grammatical subject ‘what can be thought and spoken of,’ ‘something or other’ is to be understood as the predicate complement and a statement with a truth value is made, b) on Mourelatos’ interpretation, in rejecting ‘οὐκ ἔστιν’ Parmenides is rejecting all negative predications of a certain kind while on the present interpretation he is merely claiming that what can be thought of and spoken of must be something or other.

25 ‘Notes on Parmenides,’ 12

26 ‘The Thesis of Parmenides,’ 716

27 The Presocratic Philosophers, 166

28 ‘Elements of Eleatic Ontology,’ 255

29 ‘Eleatic Questions,’ 84, n.2

30 ‘Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,’ 5

31 I owe this point to Mourelatos ('Some Alternatives,’ 11) though I am not sure that this is what he intended.

32 ‘Review of Barnes, J., The Presocratic Philosophers,’ Journal of Philosophy 78, 5 (May, 1981) 286-7Google Scholar

33 ‘The Thesis of Parmenides,’ 722, n.26

34 Ibid., 712-13

35 This is also the interpretation of Furth ('Elements of Eleatic Ontology,’ 258-63). Parmenides’ mistake is the assumption that statements that describe no actual state of affairs (i.e., false statements) are meaningless. I find the ascription of this assumption to Parmenides gratuitous.

36 ‘Determinancy and Indeterminancy, Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 2 (1976), 51

37 Scott Austin (Parmenides, 1) quotes Jack Kerouac, ‘Don't worry about nothing,’ and then describes his book as dedicated to disregarding Kerouac's advice. If Austin had understood Parmenides’ poem, he would not, I think, have written this (unless it is offered tongue-in-cheek or merely to indicate that the book was not thoughtlessly written). Neither I nor, I think, Parmenides would deny that one can worry about the word ‘nothing,’ and perhaps its meaning or even the concept associated with it. But worrying about these things is not the same as worrying about nothing.