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Origins Are Not Essences in Evolutionary Systematics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mohan Matthen
Mohan Matthen*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, CanadaV6T 1Z1
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Extract

Natural selection explains why humans have eyes: eyes are useful for getting around in an illuminated world; without them we would get around a lot less effectively, at much greater risk, and with a great deal less appreciation of potential mates. One might think, therefore, that natural selection explains why you or I—humans as we are—have eyes. But the inference has been contested by a number of able philosophers, starting with Elliott Sober and going to Joel Pust. The disputants divide as follows. Sober, Denis Walsh, and Pust hold that though natural selection explains why humans as a species have eyes, it doesn't explain why particular humans have them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 2002 , pp. 167 - 181
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2002

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References

1 Elliott Sober, The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1984) and ‘Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1995) 384-7; Joel Pust, ‘Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001) 201-20

2 Denis Walsh, ‘The Scope of Selection: Sober and Neander on What Natural Selection Explains,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998) 250-64

3 Karen Neander, ‘What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to Sober,’ Philosophy of Science 55 (1988) 422-6, ‘Pruning the Tree of Life,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1995) 59-80, ‘Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober's “Reply to Neander”,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1995) 583-7

4 Mohan Matthen, ‘Evolution, Wisconsin Style: Selection and the Explanation of Individual Traits,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1999) 143-50

5 Sober was the commentator on a paper given by Pust at the 2001 meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division. I thank him (i.e., Sober) for sending me a copy of his comments, and for subsequent clarificatory correspondence.

6 I also argued that Sober's own arguments did not suffice to make the case for Anti-Individualism. Since Pust does not repeat or rely on those arguments, they are not relevant here.

7 This argument occurred to me during a conversation with Bernie Linsky. It might well have been his, with no added contribution from me.

8 See Mohan Matthen and Andre Ariew, ‘Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection,’ Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002) 55-83, section IX, for a discussion between statistical trends and concrete processes. The argument that is given there is quite general. In ‘Evolution, Wisconsin Style,’ I claimed, with insufficient generality, that Anti-Individualism could be defeated in the particular case of sexual reproduction. Tim Lewens, in ‘Sex and Selection: A Reply to Matthen British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001) 589-98, points out that the argument need not be so confined.

9 Pust did arrive at this dependence on his own; earlier drafts of his paper were in circulation before mine was published.

10 We need not insist that every characteristic of humans — DNA-based genetics, sexual reproduction, vertebrate structure — is unessential. It is enough for the anti-Aristotelian to argue that even the conjunction of all essential characteristics is insufficient to define any species. I'll ignore this for the sake of simplicity.

11 In ‘Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear,’ Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998) 105-32, I argue that certain relational characteristics, such as membership in a population, and certain relationships with other individuals, might be essential to all members of species qua members of that species.

12 See Brent D. Mishler and Robert N. Brandon, ‘Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept,’ Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987) 397-414; Kevin de Queiroz and Michael J. Donoghue, ‘Phylogenetic Systematics and the Species Problem,’ Cladistics 4 (1988) 317-38; and my ‘Biological Universals’ for relevant discussions of the species category.

13 In earlier versions of this paper, I failed to distinguish between OES and the method of collection, and thus I claimed that evolutionary systematics was committed to OES. This was a mistake: the claim here is that OES is an undesirable proposition spawned in evolutionary systematics by OEI.

14 See Richard Cartwright, ‘Some Remarks on Essentialism,’ Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968) 615-26. I am indebted to a conference presentation by L.A. Paul, ‘Essentialism,’ for the references. Her paper suggested the line of thought that follows, though it is different from her own.

15 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell 1986), 252

16 I am indebted to the following for helpful comments and discussion: Andre Ariew, Tim Lewens, Karen Neander, Joel Pust, Elliott Sober, two anonymous referees, and the responsible editor.