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Optimific, Right, But Not Obligatory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
Utilitarianism has recently been criticised on two counts in a recent number of Ratio. According to Terrance C. McConnell, it represents many of the acts which are ordinarily regarded as supererogatory as obligatory, and some (perhaps all) of the others as actually wrong. In support of the latter criticism, he gives two kinds of examples: cases of self-sacrifice, and cases of trivial favours. Acts of self-sacrifice performed for the sake of others’ good, but which result in a greater balance of harm over benefits than alternative acts would produce, would, he claims, normally be regarded as heroic, but are forbidden as wrong by the utilitarian: and of two alternative trivial favours, either of which would ordinarily count as supererogatory (i.e. desirable but not obligatory) the utilitarian must treat the more beneficial as an obligation, and the less beneficial alternative as unallowable. These departures from ordinary responses are considered grounds for seriously doubting the adequacy of utilitarianism.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1982
References
1 McConnell, Terrance C. ‘Utilitarianism and Supererogatory Acts,’ Ratio, 22 (1980) 36-8Google Scholar
2 Similar questions are discussed at greater length, and to similar effect, by Christopher New in ‘Saints, Heroes and Utilitarians,’ Philosophy, 49 (1974) 179-89, at pp. 185-88.
3 ‘Utilitarianism, Supererogation and Future Generations,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1979) 461-6
4 Thus also in ‘Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations,’ in Sikora, R.I. and Barry, Brian eds., Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University press, 1978), 112-66,Google Scholar at p. 151.
5 I have discussed related matters more fully in ‘Supererogation and Double Standards,' Mind, 88 (1979) 481-99, at pp. 482-85, 486ff.