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Openmindedness and truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

J. Adam Carter  and
Emma C. Gordon
J. Adam Carter*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences, Eidyn Research Centre, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, Rm 5.04, 3 Charles Street, EdinburghEH8 9AD, UK
Emma C. Gordon*
Affiliation:
31 York Place, EdinburghEH1 3HP, UK
*
*Corresponding authors. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
*Corresponding authors. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.

Keywords

openmindednesstruthintellectual virtueepistemic value
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 207 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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