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Occurrent states

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Gary Bartlett
Gary Bartlett*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Central Washington University, Ellensburg, WA, USA
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that occurrent states are active states.

Keywords

Active stateconscious statedispositionmanifestationoccurrent beliefoccurrent statestanding state
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , 2018 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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