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Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

T. M. Scanlon
T. M. Scanlon*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.

Keywords

Normative realismmoral realismontology supervenience
Type
Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons; author meets critics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 6 , 2017 , pp. 877 - 897
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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References

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