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Non-backtracking Counterfaduals and the Conditional Analysis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
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The conditional analysis of ability statements has many versions. In this paper I will deal with the version which claims that ‘x can do y’ is equivalent to ‘if x were to choose to do y, then x would do y.’ However, my comments should be equally applicable to any analysis of ability statements that can properly be called a version of the conditional analysis. The intuition behind the conditional analysis is that what it is for one to be able to do something is for one's choice to be effective. To have an ability to do y is for it to be true that one's choosing to do y would be effective - one's choosing to do y would result in one's doing y . But this intuition is not captured by the conditional analysis in its standard form, and a restriction is needed to mend this defect. This restriction is based on a distinction among counterfactual conditionals.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1985
References
1 A crucial question which I will not discuss in this paper is how plausible this intuition is.
2 Downing, P.B. ‘Subjunctive Conditionals, Time Order, and Causation,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1959) 125–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 For a discussion of backtracking counterfactuals see Lewis's, David ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,’ Nous, 13, (1979) 455–75;CrossRefGoogle Scholar also see Jackson's, Frank ‘A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 55 (1977) 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 For ease of presentation I will make the limit assumption - that some worlds are closer than any others to the actual world. None of my arguments depend on this assumption.
5 This was suggested by a referee for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
6 My thanks to Jonathan Bennett, Paul Hrycaj, Tom McKay, John Robertson, and Peter van Inwagen.