1 Wilcox, J.T. Truth and Value in Nietzsche (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1974)Google Scholar, esp. 155-70. Kaufmann, W. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist ﹛Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974)Google Scholar, 4th Edition, 357-60

2 Danto, A.C. Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan 1965)Google Scholar. Cameron, J.M. ‘On the Edge,’ New York Review of Books, 27 (Oct. 9, 1980) 26–8Google Scholar

3 Whenever available I have used Kaufmann's translations and for the German, Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), ed. Colli, G. & Montinari, M. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1967ff.)Google Scholar, but unless otherwise indicated, instead of citing the page of Nietzsche's text, I will cite the section. Thus any edition may be consulted.

See The Gay Science (GS), trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Vintage 1974), 109Google Scholar. The Will to Power (WP), trans. Kaufmann, W. & Hollingdale, R.J. (New York: Vintage 1968), 569Google Scholar; for the German of WP see Nietzsche's Werke (NW) (Leipzig: Kröner 1910ff.), XV, XVI since the numbering of sections in other editions does not match Kaufmann.

4 Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (TAG), trans. Cowan, M. (South Bend: Gateway 1962). 4Google Scholar. WP, 12A, 489, 517-20

5 ‘On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense’ (TF) in Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (CWN), ed. Levy, O. (New York: Russell & Russell 1964). pp. 179–80Google Scholar (and for the German, KGW, Ill 2, pp. 373-5). Human, All-Too-Human, I (HH, I) in CWN, VI, 11, 19. WP, 518,521,715

6 GS, 109. Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Vintage 1966). 22Google Scholar. WP, 629-32

7 Birth of Tragedy (BT). trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Vintage 1967), 1, 7, 9Google Scholar. Ecce Homo (EH), trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Vintage 1967)Google Scholar. ‘Why I Am a Destiny,’ 4. WP, 853 I

8 Twilight of the Idols (TI), trans. Hollingdale, R.J. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968)Google Scholar, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 1. WP, 407, 517-8, 520, 569, 576, 594

9 On the Genealogy of Morals (GM), trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Vintage 1967),Google Scholar ‘First Essay,’ 13. Tl, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 6 and ‘How the “Real World” at Last Became a Myth.’ WP, 12A, 17, 461, 485, 487, 556

10 BGE, 4. GS, 111. WP, 512-6

11 TF, pp. 177-80 (and KGW, III 2, pp. 372-5). HH, I, 11. BGE, 20. Tl, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 5. WP, 484, 631

12 GS, 57. BGE, 192. Tl, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 5 and ‘The Four Great Errors,’ 4, 5. WP, 479, 481, 500, 505, 507, 512, 515, 516-7, 521, 556, 569, 604, 616. However, see Tl, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 2

13 The Wanderer and His Shadow in CWN, VII, 17. BGE, 22, 38, 47

14 GS, 374. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 12. WP, 481, 556,600

15 BGE, 4, 11. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 28. WP, 493, 583A

16 BT, 3. WP, 516

17 BT, 1, 3, 7-8

18 See the admirable treatment of Grimm, R.H. Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge (Berlin: de Gruyter 1977), 17–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 TF, pp. 175-80 (and KGW, Ill 2, pp. 371-5). BGE, 4. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 24, 28. WP, 853 I

20 BGE, 43,202,210,231. The Anti-Christ (AC), trans. Hollingdale, R.J. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968), 50Google Scholar. WP, 15, 487, 497, 532

21 BT,1,2,4,5

22 BGE, 9. GM, ‘Second Essay,’ 11, 22 and ‘Third Essay,’ 24. EH, ‘Why I Am a Destiny,’ 7, 8

23 GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 27. WP, 3, 5

24 WP, 481, 619, 636

25 BGE, 21. GM, ‘First Essay,’ 13. Tl, ‘The Four Great Errors,’ 1-4. WP, 531, 550-1, 624, 631

26 HH, I, 106. Tl, ‘Morality as Anti-Nature,’ 6 and ‘The Four Great Errors,’ 8. WP, 331, 373, 556, 634-5, 638, 1032, 1066. For a discussion, from the perspective of modern science, of many of these issues (though Nietzsche is never mentioned), see 8. Russell, ‘On the Notion of Cause,’ in Feigl, H. and Brodbeck, M. eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts 1953), 387–407Google Scholar.

27 KGW, V 2, p. 421. Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Viking 1966)Google Scholar, 4th Part, ‘The Drunken Song,’ 10

28 BGE, 12. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 7. WP, 45-6, 633, 636

29 BGE, 51, 61, 188-9,225,227. GM, ‘Second Essay,’ 16-7 and ‘Third Essay,’ 1, 7, 16, 25, 27-8. Tl, ‘Morality as Anti-Nature,’ 3

30 BGE, 12, 16-9, 21. GM, ‘First Essay,’ 13. Tl, ‘Four Great Errors,’ 3-4. WP, 475-81, 483-5, 488, 490, 501-2, 523-4, 526, 532

31 Tl, ‘“Reason” in Philosophy,’ 5 and ‘Four Great Errors,’ 3-4. WP, 481, 485, 521, 556, 560, 562, 569, 604, 634-5

32 This too is the view of Grimm, 62-5, 113-14.

33 WP, 254, 481, 556. EH, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra,’ 3

34 WP, 533-4

35 BGE, 210. AC, 50. WP, 15, 487, 535, 853 I

36 BGE, 22

37 In the early writings, when Nietzsche discussed the terror of becoming and sought an escape from it, he several times formulated or came close to formulating the doctrine of eternal recurrence, but then rejected it; see TAG, 13. The Use and Abuse of History in CWN, V, sections I, II. Schopenhauer as Educator, trans. Hillesheim, J.H. & Simpson, M.R. (South Bend: Gateway 1965)Google Scholar, Chapt. 1. Dawn of Day (OD) in CWN, IX, 124.

For a discussion of earlier approximations to the doctrine of eternal recurrence in the history of philosophy, see Magnus, B. Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana Univeristy Press 1978), 47–68Google Scholar.

38 GS, 341. Also, Z, 3rd Part, ‘On the Vision and the Riddle,’ 2 and ‘The Convalescent,’ 2. WP, 55, 417, 1057-67. NW, XII, 90-132. KGW, V 2, pp. 421,432-3

39 Z, 2nd Part, ‘On Redemption;’ and 3rd Part, ‘On Old and New Tablets,’ 3; and 4th Part, ‘The Drunken Song,’ 1, 9-1 1. GS, 276. EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever,’ 9-10. WP, 1041 . Also compare Nietzsche's discussion of internal relations; see note 26 above.

It may well be that the doctrine of amor fati arose in part as a response to Nietzsche's own suffering. He was often ill, confined to bed, unable to work, and he suffered great pain from migraines and vomiting. Such suffering was completely out of his control. Unable to fight it, perhaps his solution was to turn this ‘thus it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it,’ to decide to accept it fully, to love his fate, to decide that he would have it no other way, and thus to break its psychological stranglehold (see especially, EH, ‘ Why I Am So Wise,’ 6).

40 WP, 55

41 Wilcox, 155-70. WP, 1057, 1062, 1064, 1066-7. NW, XII, 90-114. KGW, V2, pp. 421’ 432-3

42 Danto, 203-13. Magnus, 74-117. Sterling, M.C. ‘Recent Discussions of Eternal Recurrence: Some Critical Comments,’ in Nietzsche Studien, ed. Behler, E. Montinari, M. Müller-Lauter, W. Wenzel, H. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1977), VI, 261–8Google Scholar. For another defense, see Combee, J.H. ‘Nietzsche as Cosmologist,’ Interpretation, 4 (1974) 38–47Google Scholar.

43 BGE, 14, 24. GS, 344, 373. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 23-5. WP, 516,521,555,606,853 I. Just one example: to prove eternal recurrence, Nietzsche argues (very roughly) that time is infinite and force (as well as the possible combinations of force) finite. Thus, in infinite time, all possible combinations of force would recur (WP, 1066). To establish the premise that force is finite, Nietzsche argues that ‘the world as force, may not be thought of as unlimited, for it cannot be so thought of.’ (WP, 1062). Such an argument can hardly be taken seriously when Nietz· sche also tells us in discussing logic that our inability to think something, or its irrefutability, is no indication whatsoever of its truth or falsity (WP, 516, 535). It might, of course, be argued that Nietzsche simply contradicts himself or changes his mind. But if we take seriously Nietzsche's view that all is interpretation, then these scientific proofs are not proofs in the ordinary sense, but formulations of the doctrine of eternal recurrence from the perspective of science–Just another perspective, Just as much illusion as any other.

44 Z, 3rd Part, ‘The Convalescent,’ 2

45 See note 26 above.

46 HH, I, 106. WP, 1064, 1066

47 Magnus, 67-8, 103-10. For another criticism, see Sterling, 291.

48 GS, 341. Also, Z, 3rd Part, ‘The Convalescent,’ 2. Danto (204) also argues that empirical comparison is impossible, but does so without assuming the temporal identity of cycles; see also Tl, ‘Morality as Anti-Nature,’ 5.

49 I. Soli, ‘Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-Examination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’ in Solomon, R.C. ed., Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Anchor 1973), 335,Google Scholar 339-40. For another criticism see Sterling, 268-75.

50 See especially, Z, 3rd part, ‘Vision and the Riddle,’ 2, where Nietzsche suggests that there is memory of past cycles.

51 Z, 3rd Part, ‘Vision and the Riddle,’ 2. WP, 1066

52 WP, 1066. A Zuboff, ‘Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence,’ in Solomon, 350-2. Krueger, J. ‘Nietzschean Recurrence as a Cosmological Hypothesis,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, 16 (1978) 442–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Since, for Nietzsche, it is not possible for two different configurations of the whole to produce identical events (KGW, V 2, p. 421) and since from any given state of the universe, all future states follow (HH, I, 106. WP, 1064, 1066), we can say that once the universe returns to the same configuration, it would repeat itself exactly. But WP, 1066 suggests that before it returns to this original state, all possible combinations would occur and that each of these would also repeat themselves eternally.

One of Sterling's criticisms of Zuboff, it seems to me, misses the point. Sterling argues that eternal recurrence would still work for Nietzsche as long as each of the variations on one's life were themselves to recur eternally. But what Sterling seems to have in mind are very mild variations, e.g., having a different Job or living in a different place (see Sterling, 279-81 ). But ‘all possible combinations’ would mean something far more radical, e.g., dying before being born, going insane before writing one's works, believing in God, or Just that the revelation of eternal recurrence would not occur in some lives. Variations of this sort could not, I suspect, be loved.

53 WP, 462

54 KGW, V 2, pp. 421-2

55 Soll, 322-5. Magnus, 116-17, 142-3. Hollingdale, R.J. Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973), 126Google Scholar. Stern, J.P. A Study of Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), 167Google Scholar. At WP, 1057, Nietzsche speaks of eternal recurrence as a prophecy, though also of a proof of the doctrine.

56 GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 19. AC, 56. WP, 15, 1011

57 WP, 1059

58 WP, 616. While Nietzsche rejects a Kantian transcendental ego, eternal recurrence does at least promise that the ego as a multiplicity of drives will return eternally the same – an absolute identity will hold from cycle to cycle. The overman would be the history of his inner drives, illusions, and valuations. Thus eternal recurrence replaces the Kantian ego. For Kant, we cannot experience the transcendental ego any more than we can for Nietzsche. For Kant it is a necessary presuppostion for the flux of our experience to be ours. Eternal recurrence, then, is an alternative interpretation which explains how the flux of our experience can be ours (only, of course, on the great year, not the dice game, theory).

59 BT, 18. Also, especially WP, 599. I cannot accept Granier's view that for Nietzsche Being has the characteristics of chaos; see Granier, J. Le problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1966), 303–4Google Scholar, 314, 317, 324, 356, 366, 376-8. In this respect Granier follows Heidegger. This, I think, is an illegitimate reintroduction of the concept of Being into Nietzsche's thought, a concept which Nietzsche rejects so completely that he goes as far as to suggest that even the characterization of reality as chaos is a mere interpretation or illusion. I also think that this mistake is the ground for the tension Granier claims to find in Nietzsche. For Granier, Nietzsche wavers between claiming that our grasp of Being is to be understood as a perspectival pragmatism (where truth is measured by its value for life) and claiming that we can have an objective revelation of being in its truth (324-5, 463-538). Both of these poles collapse if we read Nietzsche as completely rejecting the concept of Being as a sheer illusion. Ultimately, like a true skeptic, Nietzsche denies the possibility of ontology.

60 Danto, 44, 80, 230. Cameron, 26-7

61 DD, 62. Also, GS, 143. WP, 12A, 543

62 WP, 91. AC, 47. Also WP, 15. Also EH, ‘Beyond Good and Evil,’ 2

63 ‘Nietzsche to Fuchs on 18 Dec. 1888’ (translated in EH, p. 344). Also see WP, p. 85 (and NW, XV, p. 241). Also WP, 331. Also NW, XII, 350, 352.

64 GS, 300, 337. WP, 47. Zuboff (344-5) sees eternal recurrence as an alternative to the Christian afterlife.

65 Tl, ‘Maxims and Arrows,’ 3. WP, 639, 1005

66 ‘Nietzsche to Burckhardt on 6 Jan. 1889.’ On parallels between Nietzsche and traditional religion, see Hollingdale, 30-2, 34-5, 44. Stern, 102-8, 139-57. Also Altizer, T.J.J. ‘Eternal Recurrence and the Kingdom of God,’ in Allen, D. B. ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta 1977) 232–45Google Scholar.

67 Luther, Martin The Bondage of the Will, trans. Packer, J.I. & Johnston, O.B. (New Jersey: Revell 1957), 209Google Scholar

68 Stirner, M. The Ego and His Own, trans. Byington, S.T. (New York: Boni & Liveright 1918), 3–4Google Scholar. On Nietzsche and Stirner, see Löwith, K. From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. Green, D. H. (Garden City: Anchor 1967), 185–6Google Scholar.

69 Nietzsche frequently expresses interest in and identifies himself with skepticism; see, for example, GS, 122, 358. BGE, 54. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 24. AC, 12, 54. EH, Why I Am So Clever, 3. WP, 1, 55,414,437.

70 This seems to be the sense of WP, 599.

71 BGE, 208. WP, 437. For a good discussion of Nietzsche's skepticism, see Parush, A. ‘Nietzsche on the Skeptic's Life,’ Review of Metaphysics, 29 (1975) 523·42Google Scholar. Parush, however, does not discuss fideism.

72 BGE, 209·11

73 Nietzsche endorses the combination of skepticism and a conviction or faith that does not produce dependence or submission, and he links this to eternal recurrence; see BGE, 46-56. AC, 54. On the difference between Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism and between skepticism and fideism, see Popkin, R.H. The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. xii-xxii.

74 WP, 1038. For a discussion of perspectivism and belief, see Seigfried, C. H. ‘Why are Some Interpretations Better Than Others,’ The New Scholasticism, 49 (1973) 140–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 AC, 32

76 GS, 347. AC 54

77 GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 10. WP, 963. Also AC 54. If it is the case that language leads us into error, then Cameron is correct in suggesting that Nietzsche cannot tell us how things are. But Nietzsche does not attempt to do so. Nietzsche can use language to reveal the illusion involved in any use of language which claims to establish a philosophical or scientific truth. This will have to be done from some perspective and that perspective, since it employs language, will unavoidably appear to rest on assumptions which seem to be held as truths. Thus, at some later point, Nietzsche will also have to reveal these truths as illusions. In large part, I think, this explains Nietzsche's disconnected and aphoristic style as well as the seeming presence of inconsistencies and contradictions in his thought.

78 BGE, 210. GM, ‘Third Essay,’ 24. AC, 50-1. WP, 15, 483-5, 487, 497, 532, 853 I

79 BGE, 23

80 WP, 587

81 WP, 750

82 WP, 532-4

83 WP, 137, 245, 326. Magnus rejects the standard view that eternal recurrence functions as a moral imperative. He argues that there is something wrong when Nietzsche says, ‘My doctrine declares: the task is to live in such a way that you must wish to live again - you will anyway.’ (KGW, V 2, p. 403. Magnus, 111-13, 139. Also Magnus, B. ‘Eternal Recurrence,’ in Nietzsche Studien, 8 [1979]363CrossRefGoogle Scholarff.). It is meaningless, Magnus argues, to exhort us to live our lives in such a way that we would wish to live them again, if in fact we will anyway. I agree that eternal recurrence cannot be taken as a moral imperative, but not simply because it involves determinism. If the overman is to be understood on the model of the voluntarists’ God, then it is impossible to subordinate the overman to an ought simply because he himself is the only source of all values. Nietzsche says, ‘Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity.’ (EH, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra,’ 3). Neverhteless, it is legitimate for Nietzsche to speak of the overman's position as a ‘task’ to be achieved. It is achieved involuntarily, but it does require rigorous discipline and self-overcoming, as, for example, the discussion of the saint and of the ascetic ideal in BGE and GM indicate (see above note 29).

84 Compare with WP, 586C.

85 WP, 887