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Narrative and persistence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eric T. Olson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom
Karsten Witt
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany

Abstract

Many philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to do with narratives: the stories we tell about ourselves. While different narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose narrativist accounts of personal identity over time. The paper argues that such accounts have troubling consequences about the beginning and end of our lives, lead to inconsistencies, and involve backwards causation. The problems can be solved, but only by modifying the accounts in ways that deprive them of their appeal.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

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Footnotes

Olson and Witt are equal co-authors and their names appear in alphabetical order.

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