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Monotheism's Euthyphro Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

D. Goldstick*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto

Extract

The object here is to develop a moral argument against theism. By “theism” is meant the worship of a (supposed) omnipotent, all righteous God. An attitude of worship, it may be assumed, would not be an attitude of worship if it did not preclude all doubt as to the worthiness of the object of worship. At any rate, it is only this attitude whose castigation as immoral is meant to be argued for here.

There are, of course, as many theisms as there are theistic religions, sects, cults, denominations et cetera. let M be the moral code of one such theism. It is immaterial here whether the moral code M is or is not dogmatically spelled out in the theistic religion in question. The present argument will follow equally well if the believers claim nothing more than an imperfect, incomplete, and uncertain knowledge of M.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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References

1 To relieve verbal scruples, the words “multipotence” and “multiscience” could be used instead here. Insofar as the theistic God (as He is conceived) is much, much more than merely multipotent, He is, of course, a fortiori multipotent.

2 I.e., multipotence, as just defined.