Article contents
The metaphysics of propositional constituency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
In this paper, I criticize Structured Propositionalism, the most widely held theory of the nature of propositions according to which they are structured entities with constituents. I argue that the proponents of Structured Propositionalism have paid insufficient attention to the metaphysical presuppositions of the view – most egregiously, to the notion of propositional constituency. This is somewhat ironic, since the friends of structured propositions tend to argue as if the appeal to constituency gives their view a dialectical advantage. I criticize four different approaches to providing a metaphysics of propositional constituency: set-theoretic, mereological, hylomorphic, and structure-making. Finally, I consider the option of taking constituency in a deflationary, metaphysically ‘lightweight’ sense. I argue that, though invoking constituency in a lightweight sense may be useful for avoiding the ontological problems that plague the ‘heavyweight’ conception, it no longer proffers a dialectical advantage to Structured Propositionalism.
- Type
- Constituents and Constituency
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 655 - 678
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013
Footnotes
Thanks to John Keller, Michael Rea, Jeff Speaks, Marian David, and the editors of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
References
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