1 Ruben, David-Hillel ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995) 511–24;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Action and its Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press 2003)

2 This is a rough CTA Schema offered by Zhu, Jing and I in our paper ‘Causalisms Reconsidered’, Dialogue 43 (2004) 147–55,Google Scholar at 147. Mele, Alfred R. helpfully articulates the explanatory role of reasons in his book, Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press 2003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar He writes, ‘Causalists traditionally appeal, in part, to such goal-representing states as desires and intentions (or their neural realizers) in their explanations of human actions, and they take acceptable teleological explanations of human actions to be causal explanations’ (38).

3 Ruben, ‘Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of Action’ in Contemporary Action Theory, Vol. 1: Individual Action, Homstrom-Hintikka, G. and Tuomela, R. eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997), 267–86,CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 268; cf. his similar remarks in Action and its Explanation, 98.

4 Ruben, Action and its Explanation, 98.Google Scholar See also ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action,’ 512, and ‘Doing Without Happenings,’ 268.

5 Action and its Explanation, 98

6 ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, 514. See also Action and its Explanation, 147-8. It is worth noting that in Action and Its Explanation, 104-10, Ruben argues that intentions cannot be rationalizers of action. I will not take up Ruben's arguments for this separate claim here. I take it that the executive role of intentions and their funetion in guiding and coordinating the activity of agents would be part of the story one would have to teil in making sense of intentions as rationalizers of action. For the time being, I am solely concerned with defending the necessary role of intentions in the etiology and explanation of intentional action, particularly mental action. So I will take it for granted that intentions can play a role as rationalizers of action. I hope, however, to take up this matter in detail in the near future. For a defense of the claim that intentions can be rationalizers of action, see Velleman, J. David Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989),Google Scholar especially chapters 4 and 7. I will go on record as not agreeing entirely with Velleman's strategy, given that he endorses a doxastic theory of intention. For more on the role of intentions in practical reasoning (and so as potential rationalizers of action) see Bratman, Michael ‘Intention and Means-End Reasoning’, The Philosophical Review 90 (1981) 252–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1987).

7 Action and its Explanation, 107. Ruben adds that ‘Nor does it follow, on my view, that there was no such intention.’ Of course, I would add that those who defend a central role for intentions in the etiology and explanation of action who do not aeeept the Simple View of intentional action would not insist that an intention to act would always precede an intentional action (all that is necessary is that an action was within the motivational potential of an intention). In fact, I am not certain that all defenders of the Simple View would insist on such an intention. See n. 16 below for more on the Simple View of intentional action.

8 ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, 513

9 For a fuller picture of Ruben's theory of action beyond what he says about mental action, see Action and its Explanation, especially 174-84. See also ‘Doing Without Happenings: Three Theories of Action'; and ‘The Active and the Passive’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 71 (1997) 229-46. It is worth noting in passing that Ruben dispenses with any attempts at identifying some property or properties that distinguish actions from non-actions. He Claims in Action and its Explanation that ‘there is no feature, F, other than the feature itself of being an action (or a feature which presupposes that anything that has it is an action). What makes an action what it is, is nothing other than its being an action’ (184).

10 What I will ignore that Mele takes up is Ruben's claim that desires alone cannot provide rationalizing explanations of actions. See Mele, Alfred R. ‘Agency and Mental Action,’ Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997) 231-49,Google Scholar at 238-40.

11 In ibid., 235-8.

12 ‘A Plea for Mental Acts,’ Synthese 129 (2001) 105-28, at 108

13 ‘Cognitive Trying,’ in Contemporary Action Theory, Vol. 1, G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomelo, eds., 287-314; see 289-91. For similar views, see Adams, Fred and Alfred R., Mele ‘The Intention/ Volition Debate,’ Canadiern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992) 323–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Different deflationary aecounts of the will are also offered by Armstong, David The Nature of Mind (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1980), 68–88;Google Scholar and Cleveland, Timothy ‘Trying Without Willing,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992) 324–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Compare the volitionist aecounts endorsed by Ginet, Carl ‘Trying to Act,’ in Freedom and Determinism, Campbell, J.K. O'Rourke, M. and Shier, D. eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004), 89–102;Google Scholar Hornsby, Jennifer Actions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980), eh. 3;Google Scholar McCann, Hugh J. The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and F-reedom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998), eh. 5;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Brian, O'Shaughnessy ‘Trying (As the Mental “Pineal Gland“)/ in The Philosophy of Action, Mele, A. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), 53–74,Google Scholar at 56 and The Will, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980).

14 Adams and Mele write in ‘The Intention/Volition Debate’ that ‘Roughly, trying to A is an event or process that has A-ing as a goal and is initiated and (normally) sustained by a pertinent intention. Successful tryings to A, rather than causing A-ings, are A-ings’ (326).

15 Thanks are due to Randolph Clarke for pointing out this distinetion between a component versus product view of the role of an intention in trying.

16 For my purposes here, I am remaining non-committal with respect to the two views. It is worth noting that on the Single Phenomenon View, S's intention may include A-ing in what Michael Bratman calls its ‘motivational potential’ although S does not, strictly speaking, intend to A. See his paper, ‘Two Faces of Intention’ in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele, ed., 178-203, at 198. For defenses of versions of the Single Phenomenon View, see the article by Myles Brand, ‘Intention and Intentional Action’, in Contemporary Action Theory, Vol 1, G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, eds., 197-217; and Mele, Alfred R. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press 1992),Google Scholar eh. 8. For defenses of the Simple View, see Adams, Frederick ‘Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View’, Mind and Language 1 (1986) 281–301;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Chan, David K. ‘A Not-So-Simple View of Intentional Action’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999) 1–16;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Garcia, Jorge ‘The Intentional and the Intended’, Erkenntnis 33 (1990) 191–209;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and McCann, Hugh The Works of Agency, eh. 10.Google Scholar

17 On pages 520-1. A version of the case of the forgetful thinker appears in Action and its Explanation, 149-50. But the version in ‘Mental Overpopulation’ is more fully developed and thus a better target.

18 ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, 520.

19 Ibid., 520

20 Ibid., 521. John Bishop suggested a third Interpretation of what oecurs in the case of the FORGETFUL THINKER is that it is a case of akrasia. Of course, such an interpretation may also threaten the CTA given that it would be an instance of akrasia where the akratic action is not caused by any relevant intention. There would be a failure to act in a way that conforms to an agent's intention. Such an interpretation is challenging. But I will not consider it here.

21 Both John Bishop and an anonymous referee for this Journal advised that I explain why discussing (b)-scenarios is not otiose.

22 ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, 521

23 Ibid., 521

24 Ibid., 522

25 Ibid., 522

26 The capacity for such metamental control by agents is discussed in the psychological literature on metacognition. For interesting discussions, see Cornoldi, Cesare ‘The Impact of Metacognitive Reflection on Cognitive Control’, in Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology: Monitoring and Control Processes, Mazzoni, G. and Nelson, T. eds. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 1998), 139–59;Google Scholar and Fernandez-Duque, Diego Baird, Jodie A. and Posner, Michael I. ‘Executive Attention and Metacognitive Regulation’, Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2000) 288–307CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

27 Wegner discusses the findings in Wegner, Daniel M. Schneider, David J. Carter, Samuel R. III, and White, Teri L. ‘Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1987) 5–13;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed Wegner, Daniel M. ‘Ironie Processes of Mental Control’, Psychological Review 101 (1994) 34–52;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Wegner, Daniel M. White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts: Suppression, Obsession, and the Psychology of Mental Control (New York: Guilford 1994).Google Scholar

28 Wegner, White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts, 4Google Scholar

29 ‘Ironie Processes of Mental Control’, 34

30 White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts, 2

31 Ibid., 4

32 See ibid., chs. 2-6

33 In conversation, Rebekah Rice noted that it seems that if the agent's thinking is like Wegner's subjects, then the activity would lack a goal; but it seems that the FORGETFUL THINKER's thinking is aimed at some end — viz., remembering a name or solving a puzzle. So the FORGETFUL THINKER's mental behavior is different from that of Wegner's subjects. While this may be right, the etiology of the mental behavior of both the subjects and the FORGETFUL THINKER is similar in ways that suggest that both fall prey to the ironic processes of mental control. So in spite of the apparent purposefulness of the FORGETFUL THINKER's mental behavior, its etiology seems sufficiently similar to that of Wegner's subjects to warrant the comparison.

34 Of course, as Hugh McCann pointed out to me, it seems unlikely that the agenf s thinking would be unintentional and non-actional if the agent continued to think about the puzzle or name for very long.

35 This was suggested to me by Hugh McCann.

36 ‘Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of Action’, 521

37 Ibid., 521

38 Hugh McCann brought this feature of intention to my attention.

39 In McCann, The Works of Agency, 142

40 Ruben, Action and Its Explanation, 104-10

41 Bishop, John ‘Naturalising Mental Action’, in Contemporary Action Theory, Vol. 1, Holmstrom-Hintikka, G. and Tuomela, R. eds., 251–66,Google Scholar at 259-64. Ruben's discussion of Bishop is in Action and Its Explanation, 150-2.

42 Ibid., 260

43 Action and Its Explanation, 151

44 See Bratman's ‘Valuing and the Will’, Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000) 249-65, especially 258.

45 Ibid., 258

46 Particularly in Action and Its Explanation, 91-110.

47 I am grateful to Jesus Aguilar, John Bishop, Randolph Clarke, Zac Cogley, Alfred Mele, David-Hillel Ruben, Rebekah Rice, Jing Zhu, two anonymous referees for this Journal, and especially Hugh J. McCann for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. While their comments have helped me to avoid many errors, the mistakes that remain are entirely my own.