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Individuating Fregean sense
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
While it is highly controversial whether Frege's criterion of sameness and difference for sense is true, it is relatively uncontroversial that that principle is inconsistent with Millian–Russellian views of content. I argue that this should not be uncontroversial. The reason is that it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an interpretation of Frege's criterion which implies anything substantial about the sameness or difference of content of anything.
- Type
- Constituents and Constituency
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 634 - 654
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013
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