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Hylomorphism without forms? A critical notice of Simon Evnine’s Making Objects and Events

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael J. Raven Open the ORCID record for Michael J. Raven [Opens in a new window]
Michael J. Raven*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada
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Abstract

Simon Evnine’s Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts develops amorphic hylomorphism. I critically discuss three of its main themes. One theme is its attempt to do the work of form without forms. A second theme is the requirement that hylomorphs have ‘metabolisms at work’. A third theme is the use of artifacts as the paradigms for hylomorphs. I will raise some criticisms of each of these themes. Although the themes might at first appear disconnected, I believe the third underwrites the first two. So the criticisms of the third theme also bear on the rest.

Keywords

Hylomorphismartifactsobjectsorganismsactions
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 5 , August 2019 , pp. 652 - 669
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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Footnotes

§

Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

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