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How to tell essence (when you sense one)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ivan V. Ivanov
Ivan V. Ivanov*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan, China
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Abstract

How could perceptual experiences reveal matters of essentiality? Answering this question is crucial for vindicating a thesis about the epistemic import of experience, commonly known as Revelation. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong version. Only on the strong one could it make up an authoritative piece of common sense. But this version also seems to demand too much of our experiences, namely that they can reveal essentiality. However, the impression that our experiences are not suited for this turns out to be due to a non-mandatory assumption about how the revelation of essentiality would work.

Keywords

Revelationperceptual knowledgeessencenecessityintrinsicalitycolor
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , March 2019 , pp. 147 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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