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Functional Words, Facts and Values

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

A. W. Cragg*
Affiliation:
Laurentian University

Extract

Functional words are of substantial interest in moral philosophy because they appear to lie at the juncture of description and evaluation. This is no doubt the reason that they have played a significant part in much recent discussion of the relation between facts and values. Yet, in spite of the many discussions in which functional words have made an appearance, their significance for an understanding of the relation between facts and values remains unclear. A thorough-going examination of the nature of functional words would appear to be in order. And while such a study is beyond the scope of a single article it should nevertheless be possible to make a beginning. That, at any rate, is my objective in what follows.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1976

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References

1 The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 100.Google Scholar

2 R.M. Hare, op. cit., p. 100.

3 Williams, Bernard and Montefiore, Alan Ed., British Analytical Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 190.Google Scholar Note that the formulation offered by Montefiore is that if something does that for which it is made it is well.

4 R.M. Hare, op. cit., p. 101.

5 One might add here ‘A is a better auger than B as things stand’. For it is possible that A even though it bores holes in wood does so badly or inefficiently. Or A might be easily broken. That is to say, A, though better than B, might nevertheless be a bad auger. B, on the other hand; might simply need to be sharpened or repaired. Indeed, it might be, if it were to be repaired, a much better auger than A. (The reader should note here the comments which follow on page 85.) Thus things might easily change. But be that as it may, if my situation requires an evaluation of A and B as they stand, A is better than B.

6 Sprigge, Final Causes’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1971, p. 190.Google Scholar

7 The notion of an internal relation is borrowed from an article by Philippa Foot in Mind, 1958, entitled ‘Moral Beliefs’.

8 To describe something as having a recognized use does not imply that the use is widely known, widespread or acceptable. For example, an H-bomb is an F-object whose use would be regarded by many as unacceptable. And there is no doubt that many F-objects designed for highly specialized purposes have a use which is recognized in my sense of the word but recognized by perhaps as few as one person.

9 There is a possible ‘fly in the ointment’ here to which I wish to draw the reader's attention. Hare in The Language of Morals, (p. 101 & p. 37), and in ‘Geach: Good and Evil’ (Analysis, 1959, p. 64) does suggest a possible view of F-inferences which would appear to entail that instrumental evaluations (F-conclusions) are not genuine evaluations after all. If Hare is correct, then F-words do not offer the problems for the non-naturalist which this article is designed to generate. To examine Hare's suggestion would require many pages. And an addition of these dimensions to this argument is not feasible. However, having carried out an analysis of the account hinted at by Hare in the places noted, I am of the view that it can be shown to be incorrect.

10 At I Corinthians 13, vs. 4 - 7, Paul appears to provide an account of love which links it to a series of secondary characteristics in the absence of which love is not possible, or so it would seem.