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Explanationist Seeking Agreement with Bergmann

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2025

William G. Lycan
William G. Lycan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper expresses extensive agreement with Michael Bergmann’s position in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, but (i) offers a simpler response to the skeptic, (ii) takes issue with Bergmann’s strong claim that an “evil demon” hypothesis is as good an explanation of our sensory experiences as is the natural realist explanation, and (iii) corrects a misunderstanding about explanationists’ canons of theory preference.

Keywords

skepticismexplanationismevil demontheory preferenceconservatismneatnesstestability
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 8
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Inc

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