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The Error Condition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2019

Jeremy David Fix Open the ORCID record for Jeremy David Fix [Opens in a new window]
Jeremy David Fix*
Affiliation:
Keble College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Abstract

The possibility of error conditions the possibility of normative principles. I argue that extant interpretations of this condition undermine the possibility of normative principles for our action because they implicitly treat error as a perfection of an action. I then explain how a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities explains why error is an imperfection of an action. Finally, I describe and defend the interpretation of the error condition which follows.

Keywords

Agencyactionerrorpractical reasonnormativityconstitutivism
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 34 - 48
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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