1 It is not clear that this constituted a legally recognized phase of the trial procedure, or just an interlude of which Socrates makes use for his final words to any who would listen. The fact that such a final speech also occurs in Xenophon's account of the trial, however, lends some weight to its actual occurrence, though plainly we cannot tell whose version of the speech, if either, is historically reliable. In any case, it is not our purpose in this paper to uncover the views of the historical Socrates, but rather to examine a problem deriving from Plato's account. (For more on the legal status of the third speech, see Burnet, John Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1924]. 161–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar)

2 That there are only two groups to whom Socrates speaks tells against those who accept Diogenes Laertius' confused suggestion that a greater majority voted against Socrates on the second vote (to condemn him to death) than had voted against him on the first one (to convict him).

3 This and the next quote are H.N. Fowler's translation.

4 See Apology 31D, 40C, 41D; Euthyphro 3B; Euthydemus 272E; Republic 496C; and Phaedrus 242B.

5 Memorabilia 1.1.4, 4.3.12, 4.8.1; Apology 12

6 Apology 21B, D, 23A, 29B; Euthyphro 5A-C; Laches 186B-C; Lysis 212A; Hippias Major 286C-E; Gorgias 509C

7 See, for example, West, Thomas G. Plato's Apology of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979), 226,Google Scholar who sees Socrates’ use of diamuthologesai at 39E5 as a warning to ‘his listeners not to take the rest of the speech too seriously.’ This, however, is simply a mistaken way to read the Greek, for the word means nothing subtle, but rather only ‘to talk with one another.’ As Burnet says, ‘There is no suggestion of “myth” in the word' (note on 39E5, 165). Another who doubts the force of Socrates' proof appears to be Reginald Hackforth who says nothing about the proof itself, but nonetheless concludes that Socrates’ views of the issue remain ‘quite agnostic,’ just as they had been at 29A-B (The Composition of Plato's Apology [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1933], 171), presumably (though not explicitly) on the basis of Socrates' final words to the jury. (But about this, see note 17, below.)

8 See, for example, Gulley, Norman The Philosophy of Socrates (London: Macmillan 1968), 62–74.Google Scholar

9 At Apology 31C-D, Socrates tells the jury that they have heard him talk about his daimonion ‘ at many times in many places.’ See also Euthyphro 3B.

10 The second of the religious charges in the indictment; according to Diogenes Laertiusm the relevant part of the official indictment read, ‘Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods of the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth.’ Both Plato and Xenophon explicitly tie the ‘new divinities’ charge to Socrates’ daimonion (Plato, Apol. 31D, Euth. 3B; Xen., Apol. 12). Some have doubted this connection, however (see, for example, Burnet, notes on Euth. 3B5 [15-17], Apol. 24C1 [105], 31C7 and D1 [127-8]).

11 Xenophon defends the silence of Socrates' daimonion, as showing that Socrates’ condemnation was really for the best given his age, at Mem. 4.8.1.

12 Burnet, 165-6

13 We shall soon take up the case where Socrates employs the daimonion purposefully to clarify a former alarm.

14 We know of no case where Socrates receives a daimonic alarm but ignores it, or goes ahead and completes the action or actions concerning which he had been warned. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that he learned of the advantages of following its prohibitions by trial and error.

15 At 20D, Socrates allows that he has a kind of wisdom, which he calls ‘human wisdom’ (anthropine sophia). in contrast to the sort of wisdom, which he calls ‘greater than human,’ claimed by the Sophists. But since he also denies that he has any knowledge (22C-D) it appears any wisdom Socrates has must be embodied either in his recognition of his own ignorance, or in his ability to refute those who claim to have the wisdom they lack, an ability which still does not bestow any positive knowledge in the subject matter of his refutations (23A). But this wisdom, which Socrates says is ‘of little or no value’ (23A), is not the sort Socrates claims to lack. Rather, it is the substantial, positive sort in which he, and indeed all humans, are ‘worth nothing’ (23B).

16 That Socrates believes in other forms of divination is clear not only from his account of the oracle to Chaerophon at Apology 20E-23C (see also 29A), but also from the ‘oracles and dreams’ to which he refers at Apology 33C.

17 In fact, Socrates' interpretation contains two different and quite separable accounts. The first imagines only two conceptions of the afterlife and concludes that both are preferable to life (40C4-41C8). Socrates calls this interpretation a ‘hope’ (elpis - 40C4), which would seem to disqualify it as anything certain. The second says that his death is a good because it is better for Socrates to die now and be freed from troubles (41D3-6), which does not imply anything about what follows death except that it will be better for Socrates than what he could expect if he kept on living. This is quite compatible with the general skepticism with which the dialogue concludes (42A2-S). Contra Hackforth, however, Socrates' final remark in no way vitiates the conclusion that for Socrates death will be a good thing; relative to whatever else is possible for him, death will be a blessing. Of course, it is quite compatible with this that those to whom Socrates speaks are better off living; the troubles Socrates escapes by dying might not be in prospect for those to whom Socrates speaks.