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Desire and Capacity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
This note is prompted by a re-reading of the late Professor J. L. Austin's British Academy Lecture of 1956 “Ifs and Cans” and Professor P. H. Nowell-Smith's rejoinder to it. Austin states his topic at the beginning, and though he re-formulates it more precisely later on, it will suffice for my purposes to quote the opening short paragraph. He asks: “Are cans constitutionally iffy? Whenever, that is, we say that we can do something, or could do something, or could have done something, is there an if in the offing—suppressed, it may be, but due nevertheless to appear when we set out our sentence in full or when we give an explanation of its meaning?” (p. 295). Towards the end of his lecture he states his conclusion concerning the issue, viz. determinism, which is usually prominent at least implicitly in our discussion of such questions, in the following terms: “Determinism, whatever it may be, may yet be the case, but at least it appears not consistent with what we ordinarily say and presumably think.” (p. 321, italics mine).
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References
1 Both are reprinted in the Harper and Row paperback Free Will and Determinism (edited by Bernard Berofsky). My quotations are taken from this volume.
2 Thus, for instance, how is the distinction between supplying what is required “to complete” a sentence and what is required in its “analysis” to be understood?
3 In phrasing my doubt I am selecting from Austin's summary of Moore's “suggestions” (p. 298). I do this for economy and in order not to distract attention from what I am centrally concerned with. In fact, as Austin notes, Moore moves quickly from “could have if I had chosen” to “should have if I had chosen” (in order, as he puts it, “to avoid a possible complication,” without however saying anything further about it). In his explanation of the possible source of Moore's transition (p. 307) Austin comes closest to my way of looking at the matter. Nevertheless in discussing locutions containing “could have” which purport to impute moral blame within the larger context of the general “can” of ability, without making reservations of any kind, he does seem to me to be making a basic philosophic mistake.
4 This is part of what Aristotle meant by distinguishing between theoretical and practical knowledge.
5 I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Jenny Teichmann and Rusi Khan, whose comments have enabled me to achieve a better understanding of my own position and to improve my presentation of it. They are of course not responsible for my mistakes.