Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T09:58:50.539Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

David Lewis On Convention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Dale Jamieson
Dale Jamieson*
Affiliation:
North Carolina State University, Raleigh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

A convention is a regularity in behavior, sustained by a system of preferences and expectations, that has a possible alternative: so claims David Lewis. That it is not, is what I hope to show.

In Convention; A Philosophical Study, Lewis gives an analysis of what he hopes is “our common, established concept of convention.” In developing his analysis, Lewis extensively employs the technical vocabulary of game theory. According to Lewis conventions are established by “populations” in order to solve recurring “coordination problems.” Lewis gives eleven examples of “coordination problems” which he claims are solved by convention. One example is the following:

Suppose several of us are driving on the same winding two-lane roads. It matters little to anyone whether he drives in the left or the right lane, provided the others do likewise. But if some drive in the left lane and some in the right, everyone is in danger of collision.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , September 1975 , pp. 73 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

* I am greatly indebted to Paul Ziff for his criticism and encouragement.

1 (Cambridge, 1969).

2 Ibid., p. 3.

3 The following expressions figure prominently in Convention, and are drawn either from Neumann, von and Morgenstern's, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1953, second edition)Google Scholar, or Schelling's, T. C. The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; ‘coordination', ‘expectation', ‘equilibrium point’, ‘interdependent decision', ‘alternative, ‘equilibrium', 'preference', and ‘strategy'.

4 Ibid., p. 6.

5 Ibid., p. 78.

6 36 Stat. 2259.

7 For evidence for this claim see H. Levie, “Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing law Relating to the Protection of Individuals During Armed Conflict,” and “Statement of Professor Levie,” in Carey, J. (ed.), When Battle Rages, How Can Law Protect? (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., 1971).Google Scholar

8 Lewis, op. cit., p. 29.Google Scholar

9 Ibid., p. 28.

10 Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 48–49.

11 Skinner, B. F. Walden II (Toronto, 1961).Google Scholar

12 See Gough, K. “Nayar: Central Kerala,” in Gough, K. and Schneider, D. (eds.), Matrilineal Kinship (Berkeley, 1961).Google Scholar

13 Lewis, op. cit., p. 70.Google Scholar

14 The following two paragraphs were prompted by comments on an early draft of this paper by Richard Grandy, Stanley Munsat, and Michael Resnik.