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Compatibilist Alternatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Joseph Keim Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell*
Affiliation:
Washington State University, Pullman, WA99164-5130, USA
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Extract

This paper is a defense of traditional compatibilism. Traditional compatibilism is, roughly, the view that (a) free will is essential to moral responsibility, (b) free will requires alternative possibilities of action, or alternatives for short, and (c) moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Traditional compatibilism is a version of the traditional theory of free will. According to the traditional theory, a person S performed an action a freely only if S could have done otherwise, that is, only if S had alternatives. The traditional theory is often contrasted with the source theory: S performed a freely only if S was the source of a (McKenna 2001; Pereboom 2003). One may adopt a combined view of free will that sanctions both the traditional and source theories (Kane 1996, 72-3; van Inwagen 1983). As I use the terms ‘source theorist’ and ‘traditional theorist,’ the former refers to folks who accept the source theory and reject the traditional theory; the latter refers to folks who accept the traditional theory whether or not they accept the source theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , September 2005 , pp. 387 - 406
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2005

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