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The Causality of God in Spinoza’s Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

A. J. Watt
A. J. Watt*
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Extract

Spinoza’s Ethics must contain some of philosophy’s most baffling statements. All things are animate; the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things: what would I be committed to in agreeing (or disagreeing) with these doctrines? His austere mode of exposition, sparing of illustrations and discursive explanations, ensures that any answer must be highly speculative.

His weakness for dark sayings seems to have communicated itself to some of his best-known commentators. Of course where a philosopher’s thought is itself opaque one would be unreasonable to expect lucidity in a commentator’s exposition of it. However he has been described as holding puzzling, to my mind unintelligible opinions on subjects concerning which, as far as I can see, his own statements more naturally suggest a much clearer and more comprehensible interpretation. There are problems enough in understanding his thought without adding needlessly to the list. I think there has been such an addition in discussion of his doctrines about the causal relationship between God and finite creatures, and this paper is devoted to suggesting another account of his thought on that topic which combines, I think, the advantages of being more intelligible and a more natural construction to place on his own statements, than the set of opinions generally laid at his door.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , December 1972 , pp. 171 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1972

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References

1 See for example Ethics Book I, prop. 16 and corollaries, prop. 25, scholium and corollary. (Quotations from the Ethics in this paper are from the version in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza trans. R. H. M Elwes (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1909-12) Vol. II.)

2 Joachim, Harold H. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901) p. 60.Google Scholar

3 See Ethics Book I, prop. 19.

4 Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 227.

5 Hallett, H. F. Benedict de Spinoza (London: Athlone Press, 1957) p. 48.Google Scholar

6 Ethics Book I, Appendix.

7 Ibid., prop. 33, proof and scholia. Cf. The Correspondence of Spinoza trans. A. Wolf (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928) letters 61 and 75.

8 Theological-Political Treatise Chapt. 6 (in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza Vol. I).

9 Ethics, Book I, prop. 28.

10 Ibid., Book II, prop. 9.

11 Ibid., prop. 12, proof.

12 Ibid., prop. 13.

13 Ibid, I, Appendix. Cf. the criticism of Descartes on the union of mind and body, in Ethics Book V, Preface.

14 “Theologico-Political Treatise”, Chief Works. Vol. I p. 83. With this identification in mind H. G. Hubbeling writes: “The God of Spinoza consists of fixed and eternal laws”. [Spinoza’s, Methodology (Assen: van Gorcum. 1964) p. 27). But this is not entirely satisfactory; Spinoza’s God incorporates the particular things as well as the laws governing their inter-relationships.

15 Ethics Book I, prop. 33.

16 Ethics, Book I, prop. 16.

17 Ibid., Book II, prop. 49, noie. Cf. Ethics Book I, prop. 17, note, and prop. 29, note.

18 Correspondence, letter 82.

19 Ibid., letter 83.

20 In the early Short Treatise (Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-being, trans. A. Wolf (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910) p. 120) he defined extension as the power to produce motion and rest; obviously his conception of extension was very different from Descartes’, in which divine intervention was needed to produce motion.

21 Correspondence, letter 10.

22 Ethics, Book II, prop. 10, Note 2.

23 Ibid., def. 2.

24 Ibid., Book I, prop. 7.

25 Ibid., prop. 24.

26 “On the Improvement of the Understanding”, Chief Works, Vol. II, pp. 34-6.

27 Ethics, Book II, prop. 8.

28 Ibid., note.

29 “On the Improvement of the Understanding, Chief Works, Vol. II, p. 26.

30 Ethics, Book I, prop. I.

31 Ibid., det 4.

32 See, for example. Ethics, Book II, prop. 40, note 1, and prop. 48, note.

33 Correspondence, letter 12.

34 Ethics, Book I, prop. 25, note.

35 Ibid., Book II, prop. 45, note.