All quotations from Spinoza are taken from Spinoza, Selections, ed., Wild, John Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930Google Scholar, which includes W.H. White's translation of the Ethics, R.H.M. Elwes’ translation of the Tractatus de Intellect us Emendatione (TdIE), and A. Wolf's translations of the Korte Verhaneling van God, de Mensch, en des zelfs Welstand (KV) and the Epistolae (Ep.).

1 A clear presentation of this problem can be found in Watt, A.J., “The Causality of God in Spinoza's Philosophy,”Canadian Journal of Philosophy, II, No.2, 1972, pp. 178-80.Google Scholar

2 In syllogistic form, (a) and (b) together imply that:

3 For the same concept of definition, cf. TdIE, pp. 27–28 and 37-38 in the Wild edition.

4 This bears interesting similarities to the notion of an “operational definition” introduced in this century by Bridgman, : “ … the concept of Length involves as mush as, and nothing more than, the set of operations by which length is determined.” (The Logic of Modem Physics, New York, Macmillan, 1927, p. 5.)Google Scholar Spinoza could be paraphrased as saying that ‘the concept of Circularity involves the set of operations by which a circle is determined’. Of course this mathematical example makes these two theories of definition seem more similar than they are, for normally the efficient cause of anything specified in a definition is, as far as Spinoza is concerned, Nature, not a human measurer.

5 A criterion of knowledge going back to Aristotle. Cf., Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b9-14, and Metaphysics A.1, 981a30-b6.

6 A notable exception is Wolfson, H.A. The Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 Vols., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1934, pp. 202–203.Google Scholar He in fact notes the precedent set for Spinoza by Aristotle's identification of formal and efficient cause (e.g. Physics II. 7, 198a25-27). In Aristotle's case, the point is rather different, however. He is arguing that the efficient cause of a natural thing is the same in form as its effect, not that the essence of a thing is its own cause. Hence the verbal similarities in these two doctrines hide quite different points of view.

7 I must therefore take issue with M. Gueroult's suggestion that one may sum up the first sixteen propositions by stating that, “Dieu produit nécessairement une infinite infinie de modes (Prop. 16), les uns infinis, les autres finis.” (Spinoza, Vol.I., Dieu, Aubier-montaigne, Paris, 1968, p.307)Google Scholar In a similar vein, he assumes that Propositions 24-27 are concerned with finite modes (p.325)――an assumption that must be read back into these propositions after the distinction between infinite and finite modes is drawn in Propostion 28.

8 Cf. H.H, Joachim., A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901, p. 76Google Scholar, and Gueroult (op.cit.), pp. 309–324.

9 The recognition of this problem is almost as old as the text of the Ethics. Spinoza calls attention to such a paradox in KV I. ii, (pp.64-65 of the Wild edition), and Leibniz raised it as an objection in the Theodicy (cf. Leibniz, Selections,ed. Wiener, P. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1951, p.497Google Scholar.). Joachim's critique of Spinoza, based on this contradiction, itself stems from the work of T. Camerer, Die Lehre Spinozas, Stuttgart, 1877.

10 By this term I intend a metaphysical theory which holds (in the words of a commentator on Bradley) “that the world regarded as made up of discrete objects is self-contradictory and, therefore, a world of appearances. The real is one, a world in which there are no separate objects and in which all differences disappear.” From Masterpieces of World Philosophy in Summary Form, ed. Magill, F.N. New York, Harper and Row, 1961, p. 707.Google Scholar

11 Cf. Joachim, p. 101, note 1.

12 Ibid., pp.111 and 114.

13 Watt, op.cit., p. 172, fails to note that Joachim is criticising Spinoza here, not interpreting him.

14 Joachim, op.cit., pp. 113–114.

15 Watt, op.cit. (note 1.), Curley, E.M., Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay In Interpretation, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chapter 2.

16 In taking this approach, his account follows that of M. Gueroult, although Watt seems unaware of this fact. Cf. Gueroult, op.cit., pp. 316–317 and 326-335.

17 Curley, p.49; cf. Watt, pp. 176–177.

18 Curley, p. 50.

19 Curley, p. 54.

20 Cf. Watt's statement of the problem, op.cit., p. 180.

21 Watt follows this account only for the existence of finite modes; ibid., pp. 176– 177.

22 Curley, p. 69; d. Watt, p. 177.

23 For the possible variations in the interpretation of causality in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, cf. Goudge's, T.A. The Ascent of Life, University of Toronto Press, 1961, pp. 62–64Google Scholar. Like Curley, Goudge concludes that a mere necessary condition can be termed a cause.

24 Watt, p. 182.

25 Ibid., pp. 183–184. His vision of Spinoza thus falls within the Cartesian interpretation offered, for example, by Gueroult.

26 I owe recognition of the importance of this face to comments made by Prof. David Savan on an earlier draft of this paper.

27 See, for example, the scathing remarks at E1P33,Schol. 2., and the Appendixes to Books One and Four.

28 This model occurred to me while reading Prof. Harris, ’ critical remarks on Watt's paper, “Comment”, Canadian journal of Philosophy, II, No.2, 1972, pp. 191–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 This manner of conceiving of Substance in Spinoza was stated first, and most clearly, by Wolf, A. in his Aristotelian Society address of 1927 entitled, “Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance”, reprinted in Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays,ed., Kashap, S. Paul University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1972, pp. 16–27Google Scholar. Harris (ibid., p. 195) suggests that ‘motion-and- rest’ be interpreted as ‘energy’――however, he notes himself that Extension is a ‘dynamic principle’, and so I see no reason why the attributes themselves should not be interpreted as energy.

30 Cf. Ep. 80.

31 Watt (p. 179 and note 20) seems to think that Spinoza is here critical of the idea that God is the sole cause of all things——but if this were the case, he would be criticising most of Ethics I. Rather, it is the notion that the will of God is a cause that he is criticising.

32 This objection to Descartes’ cosmology is well-echoed in Thompson's, Sir D'Arcy remarkable On Growth and Form, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 14–15Google Scholar: “Matter as such produces nothing … it can never act as matter alone, but only as the seat of energy.”

33 I am here limiting myself to the attribute of Extension both because Spinoza has more to say about the various levels of modality flowing from it, and because of limitations of space.

34 E2P13,Lem. IV,Dem. Compare Sir D'Arcy Thompson's description of the unity of an organism during development. “Great as are the differences between rates of growth in different parts of an organism, the marvel is that the ratios between them are so nicely balanced as they actually are, and so capable, accordingly, of keeping for long periods of time the form of the growing organism all but unchanged.” (op. cit., p. 60)

35 Cf. Jonas, H., “Spinoza and the Theory of Organism”, ed., Grene, M. New York, Anchor Press, 1973, pp. 259–278.Google Scholar

36 This is not intended to be an accurate account of all the properties of an ecosystem. I am obviously drawing attention to those properties which Spinoza finds most essential. Many assumptions implicit in what is here said are in fact false. The principles applicable on the level of systems of organisms are very different from those applicable to the organism as a system. (Cf. on this point Williams, G.C. Adaptation and Natural Selection, A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought, Princeton University Press, 1966.Google Scholar) The point here is that a Spinozistic ecologist would consider the same principles applicable to all levels, from the molecular to the cosmological.

37 Cf. Ep. 12, and Gueroult, Appendix 9, pp. 502–509.

38 Von Bertalanffy, L. Problems of Life, New York, 1932.Google Scholar For a clear discussion of this issue, see Lehninger, A.L. Bioenergetics, 2nd. edition, California, Benjamin, W.A. Inc., 1971, pp. 23–28.Google Scholar

39 As a number of writers have noted, however, if a biological system be considered as an aspect of its environment, then the second law of thermodynamics holds, for such systems are bound to increase the degree or rate of entropy in their environment. (On this point, d. Goudge, op.ci!., p. 173 and Lehninger, op.cit., p. 27) This interpretation is not, however, applicable to the idealized system we are here considering, for it can hardly be viewed as an aspect of a larger system.

40 Cf. EIP17, Schol.

41 Cf. Gueroult, op.cit., p. 334: “Mais précisément, ce que Spinoza a démontré dans le Corolla ire de la Proposition 24, c'est qu'on ne peut soutenir que Dieu est Ia cause par quoi les choses persévèrent dans leur existence, sans devoir accorder aussitôt qu'il est Ia cause de leur essence … ”

42 Cf. E1P15,Schol.

43 The entire debate between Watt and Harris, and Curley's discussion, depend on the acceptance of this conclusion. In this regard, it seems to me that Joachim's analysis is a truer guide to Spinoza than that of his detractors.

44 I am not implying that Spinoza would claim that such knowledge, based as it is on ‘common notions’, is ideal. My example is not intended to explicate Spinoza's epistemology, but to point up Joachim's conceptual error.

45 To complete the analogy, if the series of books were infinite, the thought expressed through each copy would be one and eternal, even though its individual expressions would decay.

46 The comments of many people have played a role in this paper's evolution, but in particular I should like to note the comments of Profs. David Savan and R.F. McRae directed to earlier drafts, which have especially added to its ‘survival value’.