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Beliefs do not come in degrees

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andrew Moon
Andrew Moon*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.

Keywords

Beliefconfidencedegrees of beliefpartial beliefdegrees
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 6 , 2017 , pp. 760 - 778
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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