Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T07:26:42.883Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. 277.

Review products

Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. 277.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Tom Vinci
Tom Vinci*
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., CanadaV5A 1S6
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 559 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Dretske, F. ‘Epistemic Operators,’ Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 1007–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See for example, A.I., Goldman ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 771–91.Google Scholar

3 Pitcher, G. A Theory of Perception (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1971), 50–7;Google Scholar the version of the argument that I present differs in important respects from Pitcher's. Pitcher himself rejects his version of the argument as invalid, though I believe that the version I have presented avoids his objections.