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Analyticity by Way of Presumption

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Edna Ullmann-Margalit  and
Avishai Margalit
Edna Ullmann-Margalit
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Avishai Margalit
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
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Extract

Given a descriptive word, what is the nature of the relation between it and the features of the object(s) to which it is supposed to apply? What is it that entitles one to assert ‘this is a horse’?

A traditional answer has been in terms of ‘Merkmal’: a (minimal) collection of features, or properties, severally necessary and Jointly sufficient for the application of the word in question. This relation - call it the Merkmal relation - between word and features is common to a variety of theories of meaning that may otherwise be in disagreement about the status of the features themselves in their relation to the object: whether they be actual or believed, perceptual or ‘essential,’ phenomenal or ‘real,’ etc.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 435 - 452
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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