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Absolute Space: Did Newton Take Leave of His (Classical) Empirical Senses?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

L.A. Whitt
L.A. Whitt*
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
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Extract

It is in the scholium of the Principia on time, space, place and motion that Newton delivers what is — arguably — a reluctant kiss of betrayal to empiricism. Right there, ‘in the main body of his chief work,’ as E.A. Burtt observes, the deed is done: ‘When we come to Newton's remarks on space and time … he takes personal leave of his empiricism.’ Reichenbach registers the event less charitably, dismissing the ‘crude reification of space that Newton shares with the epistemologically unschooled mind in its naive craving for realism.’ Injury is then added to insult as Reichenbach holds Newtonian mechanics to task for arresting the analysis of the problems of space and time for more than two centuries.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 1982 , pp. 709 - 724
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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References

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22 H. Stein in ‘Newtonian Space-Time,’ Texas Quarterly, 10 3 provides a careful analysis of the technical issues involved in what might be regarded as a defense of the third proposal referred to above. This essay is indebted to his stimulating analysis and suggestions.

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31 Newton, I., ‘De Gravitatione …,’ 127