Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T05:08:03.903Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What do you mean “This isn’t the question”?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

David Enoch  and
Tristram McPherson
David Enoch*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Tristram McPherson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
*
Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon’s picture), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.

Keywords

Scanlonmoral realismmeta-ethicsnormativityquietismmeta-metaphysicsontological commitment
Type
Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons; author meets critics
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 6 , 2017 , pp. 820 - 840
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, Truth, and Logic. 2nd ed. London: Victor Gollancz.Google Scholar
Bealer, G. 2000. “A Theory of the a Priori.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1): 1–30. 10.1111/papq.2000.81.issue-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D. 2003. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Smith, Q. and Jokic, A., 220–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eklund, M. 2015. “Fictionalism.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Zalta, E.. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/fictionalism/.Google Scholar
Enoch, D. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enoch, D., and Schechter, J.. 2008. “How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3): 547–579. 10.1111/phpr.2008.76.issue-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, R. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kim, S. 2005. “Modal Fictionalism and Analysis.” In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Kalderon, M., 116–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kramer, M. H. 2009. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Chichester and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 10.1002/9781444310641CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McPherson, T. 2011. “Against Quietist Normative Realism.” Philosophical Studies 154 (2): 223–240. 10.1007/s11098-010-9535-yCrossRefGoogle Scholar
McPherson, T. 2012. “Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by Shafer-Landau, R., Vol. 7, 205–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McPherson, T. 2015. “Supervenience in Ethics.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Zalta, E.. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/supervenience-ethics/.Google Scholar
McPherson, T., and Plunkett, D.. 2015. “Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by Shafer-Landau, R., Vol. 10, 104–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1903) 1993. Principia Ethica. Edited and introduction by Baldwin, T.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Nagel, T. 1997. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Oddie, G. 2005. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199273413.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rosen, G. 1998. “Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press).” Nous 32: 386–405. 10.1111/nous.1998.32.issue-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 2012. “The Appeal and Limits of Constructivism.” In Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by Lenman, J. and Shemmer, Y., 226–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schafer, K. 2013. “Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.” Journal of Philosophy 110: 258–281. 10.5840/jphil2013110528CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeder, M. 2014. Explaining the Reasons We Share. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Street, S. 2006. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127: 109–166. 10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Svavarsdóttir, S. 2001. “Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?” In Objectivity in Law and Morals, edited by Leiter, B., 144–193. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. 2014. Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385119.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vavova, K. 2014. “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by Shafer-Landau, R., Vol. 9, 76–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedgwood, R. 2006. “The Normative Force of Reasoning.” Nous 40: 660–686. 10.1111/nous.2006.40.issue-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedgwood, R. 2016. “Review of Being Realistic about Reasons by T. M. Scanlon.” Philosophical Quarterly 66: 213–217.Google Scholar