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What are Propositions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark Richard
Mark Richard*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses and the range of quantifiers like that in ‘Sanna believes all that Matti said’ – are states of affairs. States of affairs – and thus propositions – are not, in the primary sense, representational; what is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions. There is, it is argued, a derivative sense in which propositions are bearers of truth, but truth in that sense is a derivative, non-explanatory notion. This view is contrasted with views like the one Scott Soames develops in What is Meaning?. It’s argued that this view is superior to Soames’ in various ways.

Keywords

propositionsrepresentationpropositional attitudestruthstates of affairs
Type
Theoretical Alternatives to Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 702 - 719
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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References

Davies, M., and Coltheart, Max. 2000. “Introduction: Pathologies of Belief.” Mind and Language 15: 1–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richard, Mark. 1990. Propositional Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richard, Mark. 2013. “Introduction: Attitudes and their Ascription.” In Meaning and Context, Volume I: Context and the Attitudes. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soames, Scott. 2010. What is Meaning? Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soames, Scott. ms. A., “Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions Can’t be Correct”Google Scholar
Soames, Scott. ms. A. Response to Critics, APA session on Soames 2010, Washington DC, December 2011.Google Scholar