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Tractatus 2.0201-2.0212

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

William Gustason
William Gustason*
Affiliation:
Purdue University
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Extract

It is generally agreed that these passages are among the most important to be found in the Tractatus; they give the gist of Wittgenstein 's argument for his atomistic ontology as well as the crucial notion of propositional analysis. It is surprising therefore that most discussions of these entries are cursory and fail to set out the argument in detail.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , March 1975 , pp. 515 - 527
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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References

1 Griffin, James Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Oxford, 1964).Google Scholar

2 Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (London, 1959).Google Scholar See Chapter Two.

3 Max, Black A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Ithaca, 1964). Seep. 60.Google Scholar

4 Ibid., pp. 61–62 (his italics).

5 Anscombe, op. cit., p. 49.Google Scholar

6 I take it as obvious that ‘the F’ in (1) is also not “part of a complex sign signifying a complex.”

7 See for example Pitcher's, George The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Englewood Cliffs, N.J ., 1964), pp. 32–41Google Scholar. Not all theory-of-descriptions interpreters take this approach however. Most notably, Ms. Anscombe does not, but her discussion, though insightful, is also obscure.

8 Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford, 1953). See paragraph 60.Google Scholar

9 Griffin, op. cit., pp. 51–52Google Scholar. Notice however that Griffin uses ‘object’ and ‘particular' interchangeably, thus suggesting a ‘nominalistic’ account of states of affairs (which in fact he holds). However, nothing in his interpretation precludes a name signifying a primitive, unanalyzable property. Griffin seems to think that because descriptive (general) terms disappear in analysis so must property expressions, but this hardly follows. So far as I can see, Griffin's interpretation is neutral as between the nominalism espoused by Anscombe, Copi and himself, and the type of “realism” advocated by Stenius and Bergmann.

10 Griffin, op. cit., p. 49.Google Scholar

11 (2) is not even well-formed judging by the remarks on identity in the 5.53's. Even so, Wittgenstein would, I think, hold that what the theory of descriptions intends can be expressed in the “adequate” notation (one which, among other things, lacks the identity sign). See 5.53211.

12 Anscombe, op. cit., pp. 47–48Google Scholar. However, the two statements she gives of the thesis at issue do not seem equivalent, and neither is strictly accurate-the first is too strong, the second too weak.