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The sortal resemblance problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Joongol Kim
Joongol Kim*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Gyeongsang National University, Jinju, Korea
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Is it possible to characterize the sortal essence of Fs for a sortal concept F solely in terms of a criterion of identity C for F? That is, can the question ‘What sort of thing are Fs?’ be answered by saying that Fs are essentially those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of C? This paper presents a case study supporting a negative answer to these questions by critically examining the neo-Fregean suggestion that cardinal numbers can be fully characterized as those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of one-one correspondence between concepts.

Keywords

criteria of identitycriteria of applicationcategoriesneo-Fregeanismthe Caesar Problem
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 3-4 , August 2014 , pp. 407 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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