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Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Justin C. Clark
Justin C. Clark*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.

Keywords

PlatoSocratesunityvirtueknowledgeProtagorasLachesEuthyphroMeno
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , August 2015 , pp. 445 - 470
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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